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Do Russia and the United States share the same views of nuclear proliferation?  
This thesis seeks to answer this question by considering the case of Iran.  Both nations 
are concerned about the spread of nuclear weapons, yet have taken opposing stances on 
Iran’s nuclear program.  The United States contends that Iran is using its civilian nuclear 
program to build an atomic weapon.  Russia, on the other hand, does not publicly 
acknowledge such a view. 
The conclusions of this thesis are that threat perceptions have shaped U.S. and 
Russian views of nuclear proliferation.  Both countries have supported Iran’s nuclear 
program, but their timing coincided with major shifts in Iran’s diplomatic orientation.  
When the Cold War ended, they were left with contrasting threat perceptions of Iran; 
Russia viewed Iran as a geo-strategic trading partner, while the United States viewed it as 
a sponsor of international terrorism.  More importantly, this thesis highlights how vital it 
is for members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to remain united in 
their effort to curb the spread of nuclear weapons.  If IAEA members cannot agree on the 
risks of proliferation, then the very foundation upon which the nonproliferation regime 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Do the United States and Russia view the issue of nuclear proliferation in the 
same light?  This thesis seeks to answer this question by considering the case of Iran.  In 
the past several years, Iran has taken the media spotlight over international allegations of 
a concealed nuclear weapons program.  Iran has repeatedly denied such allegations and 
claimed that its nuclear program was strictly for peaceful purposes.  In spite of this 
denial, on February 4, 2006, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of 
Governors voted “to report its concerns about Iran’s nuclear activities, including Tehran’s 
failure to comply with its agency safeguards agreement, to the UN Security Council.”1  
The United States had spent months trying to convince Russia and China that Iran’s 
nuclear ambitions posed a threat to the nonproliferation regime and welcomed this vote 
as a step toward resolution.2  While the United States remained convinced that Iran is 
trying to build a nuclear weapon, Russia is openly less critical of Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions.  These opposing views of Iran’s nuclear intentions placed the UN Security 
Council in a dilemma on how best to respond.  The United States favored economic 
sanctions and Russia desired increased dialogue and diplomacy.3  This divergent 
response leads one to question whether they perceive the same level of threat from Iran. 
Why are Russia and the United States seemingly at an impasse with one another 
regarding nonproliferation and Iranian nuclear ambitions?  Both countries claim to have 
similar views of nuclear nonproliferation,4 yet differ considerably over Iran’s nuclear 
                                                 
1 Paul Kerr, “IAEA Reports Iran to UN Security Council,” Arms Control Today 36, no. 2, (March 
2006), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_03/MARCH-IAEAIran.asp, (March 15, 2006).  For a detailed 
explanation of the IAEA safeguards agreement, see Henry D. Sokolski, “Appendix III: Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Best of Intentions: America’s Campaign Against Strategic Weapons 
Proliferation (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001), 131-135. 
2 The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) requires the IAEA to refer a country to the UN Security Council 
when it violates its nuclear safeguards agreement.  While the IAEA had previously approved a resolution 
on September 24, 2005, that found Iran “technically” non-compliant with its IAEA safeguards agreement, 
Russia and China abstained from the vote.  For more information see, Paul Kerr, “IAEA Cites Iran on 
Safeguards Failures,” Arms Control Today 35, no. 8 (October 2005), 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_10/OCT-IAEAIran.asp (November 21, 2005).   
3 RFE/RL, “UN: Security Council Appears Deadlocked Over Iran,” March 14, 2006, 
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/03/76B1AD20-EA73-4168-A3BB-28B2C84E88D0.html, March 
16, 2006. 
4 Sergei Karaganov, “Russia and the International Order,” in Chaillot Paper: What Russia Sees N74 
(January 2005), ed. Dov Lynch (Conde-sur-Norieau, France: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2005), 26. 
2 
ambitions.  This difference of opinion has led Russia to take a more conciliatory position 
on Iran at the Security Council, compared to the United States, and raises several 
important questions.  Why does Russia continue to provide nuclear technology and 
assistance to Iran, despite warnings from the United States and the international 
community not to do so?  Why is the United States so firmly convinced that Iran is trying 
to build a nuclear weapon and Russia is not?  Do the historical relations between the two 
countries and Iran offer any clues as to why one deems Iran as a regional threat and the 
other a potential strategic partner?  Do Russia and the United States share similar views 
of nuclear nonproliferation?  How have their threat perceptions changed over time, and 
what impact has this had on their views of proliferation with the Iranian regime? 
Ultimately, this thesis finds that U.S. and Russian threat perceptions of Iran have 
changed over time and affected their views regarding proliferation.  Both countries have 
taken an active role in building Iran’s nuclear program, but their timing generally 
coincided with major shifts in diplomatic orientation and changes in leadership.  In 1974, 
for example, the United States agreed to build nuclear reactors in Iran and provide 
nuclear fuel to support the Shah’s desire for a robust civilian nuclear program, but 
canceled its support following the Iranian revolution.5  Alternatively, in 1995, the 
Russians agreed to rebuild the Bushehr nuclear reactor that had been damaged during the 
Iran-Iraq war,6 a deal made possible by their rapprochement with Iran in 1989.  What 
explains these shifts in nonproliferation policy towards Iran?  During the Cold War, the 
threat perceptions of U.S. and Soviet leaders towards the Middle East – Iran in particular 
– were shaped by their efforts to balance East against West.7  After the Islamic 
Revolution of 1979, Iran initiated an adversarial non-alignment policy that caused U.S. 
policy to shift from strictly balancing East against West, to also balancing against Iran.  
When the Cold War ended, Russia and the United States were left with contrasting threat 
perceptions of Iran; Russia viewed Iran as a geo-strategic trading partner, while the 
                                                 
5 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Nuclear Overview: Iran,” available at, 
http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/1819.html, (March 6, 2006). 
6 Roger Howard, Iran In Crisis? Nuclear Ambitions and the American Response (London: Zed Books 
Ltd, 2004), 96. 
7 Nikki R. Keddie and Mark J. Gasiorowski, eds., Neither East Nor West (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1990), 266. 
3 
United States viewed it as an exporter of terrorism and an antagonist to the Middle East 
Peace Process.  These details are traced in the chapters to follow. 
The method of analysis for this thesis is a comparative study of the relations of 
the United States and Russia, each with respect to Iran, from 1953 to 2005.  U.S. and 
Russian threat perceptions, in particular their views of nonproliferation, are compared 
and contrasted.  This thesis evaluates how major cleavages and/or restoration of relations 
with Iran have altered the threat perceptions and influenced their views on nuclear 
nonproliferation.  Through an empirical examination, this thesis compares and contrasts 
the events during 1953–1979, 1980–1991, 1992–1999, and 2000–2005.  These periods 
contain significant historical turning points that changed attitudes towards, altered 
relations with, and affected the views of nonproliferation in the United States and Russia.  
Although the critical reader may judge these time periods as being rather ambitious, it 
must be noted that the objective of this research is only to analyze significant events that 
represent trends—or a significant departure from those trends (as indicated below)—and 
not to simply to rewrite history.     
• The period of 1953–1979 was chosen for three reasons.  In 1953, the 
United States led a coup that restored the Shah to power, ushering in a period of 
favorable relations and nuclear cooperation between the United States and Iran.  In 
contrast, the Islamic Revolution of 1979 resulted in the United States breaking off 
relations and terminating nuclear cooperation with Iran, ultimately leading to a period of 
ill will that has continued until the present.  This period also captures Soviet attempts to 
subvert the Iranian government.          
• The period of 1980–1991 was chosen to explore the effect that the Iranian 
Revolution had on threat perceptions of nuclear proliferation.  It also traces the impact of 
the Iran-Iraq War, Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, and Gulf War.  Towards the end of 
this period, the Soviet Union established friendly relations with Iran and made an historic 
decision to begin nuclear cooperation with Iran for peaceful purposes.  The effects of this 
decision are taking their toll on diplomatic negotiations at the UN Security Council.         
• The period of 1992–1999 was chosen to evaluate whether changes in 
threat perceptions occurred following the end of the Cold War.  It also focuses on the 
4 
actions taken by President Boris Yeltsin’s administration and looks at the impact that 
they had on attitudes toward Iran.  This time frame is especially important due to the fact 
that Russia was facing significant domestic challenges and struggling to shape a 
consistent foreign policy.  It also begins an era of significant nuclear cooperation between 
Russia and Iran, looked upon with condemnation by the United States.  
• The period of 2000–2005 was chosen to evaluate the impact that Russian 
President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President George W. Bush had on shaping foreign 
policy toward Iran.  In addition, it traces the impact that the post–9/11 events had on 
threat perceptions, and possibly, why the United States became a much more vocal 
advocate of nuclear nonproliferation.    
CHAPTER II 
This chapter lays out the theoretical framework of the thesis.  It defines nuclear 
proliferation and describes some opposing views of its dangers.  It provides theoretical 
explanations of threat perceptions: why they are important, where they come from, and 
what impact they may have on nuclear proliferation.  Even more, this chapter emphasizes 
the importance that threat perceptions have in explaining the seemingly opposing views 
of nuclear proliferation held by the United States and Russia.  Ultimately, it provides the 
framework for which the empirical analysis will be conducted in chapters III, IV and V.   
CHAPTER III 
This chapter examines relations between Russia and Iran from 1953 to 2005.  In 
particular, it focuses on the evolution of Russian relations with Iran regarding nuclear, 
economic, and strategic interests.  It also pays close attention to official statements of the 
Russian government, which may indicate a shift in views and/or threat perceptions of 
Iran.  It focuses on how the actions of the United States may have contributed to a 
warming of relations between Russia and Iran.  Ultimately, this chapter seeks to explain 
Russia’s rationale for continuing to support Iran’s nuclear program, and possibly, why 
Russia, unlike the United States, does not perceive nuclear cooperation with Iran as a 




This chapter examines U.S.–Iranian relations from 1953 to 2005.  In particular, 
this chapter focuses on conflicts over economic and strategic interests, as well as nuclear 
nonproliferation.  Special attention is given to pre- and post-1979 views of nuclear 
nonproliferation, and how improvements in Russian–Iranian relations may have 
exacerbated U.S. threat perceptions.  As in Chapter III, special attention is paid to official 
government statements regarding U.S. views of the Iranian regime.  This chapter 
ultimately seeks to answer two questions.  First, why does the United States believe Iran 
is trying to build a nuclear weapon when Russia, publicly, does not?  Second, why does 
the United States view the Iranian nuclear program as a threat?    
CHAPTER V 
This concluding chapter is an assessment of U.S. and Russian views of nuclear 
proliferation, starting with the Eisenhower era “Atoms for Peace” initiative.8  Key events 
during this time, along with the end of the Cold War in particular, may explain why the 
United States and Russia have seemingly opposing views of nuclear proliferation 
regarding Iran.  This chapter evaluates the importance both nations place on the 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) with regard to controlling the spread of nuclear weapons.  
It also seeks to answer three important questions.  First, what importance does the United 
States and Russia place on the IAEA and NPT as instruments to control the spread of 
nuclear weapons?  Second, how have U.S. and Russian threat perceptions of Iran changed 
over time, and what impact has this had on their willingness cooperate on an Iranian 
nuclear program?  Third, do the actions of Russia and the United States provide a clear 
indication that they share the same positions on nuclear proliferation? 
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II. THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR OPPOSING U.S. AND 
     RUSSIAN VIEWS OF NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
What explains Russia’s nuclear cooperation with Iran when the United States is 
critical of such actions?  Do Russia and the United States share similar views of nuclear 
nonproliferation?  What accounts for their apparent differences regarding Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions?  To begin answering these questions, this chapter first seeks to explain the 
issues of nuclear proliferation, and then focus on theoretical explanations for why one 
state may view another as a threat, when others do not.  The ultimate aim of this chapter 
is to evaluate these issues and theories in order to understand the sources and magnitude 
of differences that the United States and Russia have regarding nuclear proliferation in 
Iran.  
B. NUCLEAR PESSIMISM VS. NUCLEAR OPTIMISM 
When discussing nuclear proliferation, it is important to establish a basic 
framework of reference.  In general, “nuclear proliferation” is defined as “an increasing 
number of non-nuclear states and, possibly in the future, non-state organizations, gaining 
access to nuclear weapons.”9 This definition encompasses two related components – 
vertical and horizontal proliferation.  Vertical Proliferation is defined as “a nuclear 
buildup by the leading nuclear states.”  Horizontal Proliferation is defines as “an increase 
in the number of countries having nuclear armaments in their armies.”10  Throughout the 
rest of this thesis, the reader should understand that references to “nuclear proliferation” 
should actually be interpreted as meaning “horizontal proliferation,” unless noted 
otherwise. 
To understand whether the United States and Russia have similar views of nuclear 
proliferation, this chapter explores the prevailing viewpoints on the subject.  There are 
essentially two opposing views of nuclear proliferation – the pessimists and the optimists, 
best represented by the work of Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz respectively.  The 
                                                 
9 Alexei Arbatov, “Horizontal Proliferation:  New Challenges,” Russia In Global Affairs 2, no. 2 
(April/June 2004), 136, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/docs/2004_english2.pdf  (December 15, 2005). 
10 Ibid.     
8 
pessimists argue that the spread of nuclear weapons will not lead to a more peaceful 
world, but will instead lead to greater instability.  Conversely, the optimists claim that the 
gradual spread of nuclear weapons will lead to greater stability and peace.  They argue 
that those who acquire nuclear weapons will understand their destructive potential and 
will be less likely to use them for fear of retaliation.  The views of the two prominent 
scholars who adhere to these respective positions are discussed below.     
1. Pessimistic View of Nuclear Proliferation – Scott Sagan   
Taking the pessimistic view, Sagan argues that the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons is bad, primarily due to inherent problems in large-scale organizations including 
militaries.  His argument rests on two central points.  First, he argues that “professional 
military organizations – because of common biases, inflexible routines, and parochial 
interests – display organizational behaviors that are likely to lead to deterrence failures 
and deliberate or accidental war.”11  For deterrence to work, these military organizations 
need to have strong civilian oversight to overcome these inherent limitations.  Second, he 
argues that future nuclear states may lack effective civilian control over their militaries 
due to weak governments and strong, inward-looking, politically-motivated military 
establishments.  Thus, they would be more prone to causing a deterrence failure or 
accidental war.  While the United States and Soviet Union successfully deterred one 
another from a nuclear exchange during the Cold War, Sagan believes they should not be 
considered a model for future nuclear weapons states.  Even in countries with strong 
civilian control – such as the United States and Soviet Union – the complex nature of 
military organizations led to many near misses. 12 
Overall, Sagan provides a dismal outlook for the future of nuclear proliferation.  
Unlike his critics, he believes that new nuclear states are a great risk to peace and 
stability.  Even if they do act rationally, the potential still exists to have a catastrophic 
nuclear accident.  Consequently, he believes that the best way to prevent a future nuclear 
detonation is to stop new states from acquiring nuclear weapons, and/or to convince 
                                                 
11 Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New 
York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 2003), 47. 
12 Ibid., 46-48 
9 
them, for reasons previously cited, that it is not in their best interest to acquire such 
weapons.13  More importantly, in his response to optimist Kenneth Waltz, Sagan states, 
While we may agree about how nuclear states actually do behave in an 
ideal world (if any nuclear world can be called ideal), we strongly 
disagree about how nuclear states actually do behave in the real world.  
Our different visions of international politics have led us to develop very 
different interpretations of our nuclear past and very different predictions 
of the nuclear future.14 
In this statement, Sagan provides a key piece of information that may help explain the 
inconsistency in U.S. and Russian perceptions of Iran.  Simply said, both he and Waltz 
arrived at entirely different interpretations by exploring the same nuclear history.  How 
they arrived at these different interpretations is explored later in this chapter.     
Sagan’s final key point highlights the growing threat posed by non-state actors, 
such as terrorists.  For example, many Jihadi terrorists believe it is their religious duty to 
kill as many American citizens as possible.  This is not a threat to be taken lightly; it 
serves as a constant reminder of the important role played by the nonproliferation regime.  
If nuclear weapons spread to the Middle East, there is an increased likelihood that a weak 
state may let an atomic weapon fall into the hands of terrorists, thereby creating the 
potential for unimaginable devastation.  Based on his knowledge of organization theory, 
Sagan believes that parochial organizations would likely control the acquisition of such 
nuclear weapons and that their special interests could play right into the hands of 
terrorists.  Thus, the only way to prevent such groups from acquiring a nuclear weapon in 
the first place is to work aggressively to curb nuclear proliferation to weak states.15       
2. Optimistic View of Nuclear Proliferation – Kenneth Waltz 
Unlike his pessimistic colleague, Waltz takes the optimistic view of proliferation.  
He argues that the gradual spread of nuclear weapons, when compared to them spreading 
rapidly or not at all, will ultimately decrease the likelihood of a nuclear exchange.  
According to realist theory, states engage in self-help to provide for their own security in 
an anarchic world.  When a state feels secure from external threats, there is a reduced 
                                                 
13 Sagan and Waltz, 84-85. 
14 Ibid., 157. 
15 Ibid., 162-164, 184. 
10 
likelihood of interstate conflict.  In applying the principle of self-help, states believe that 
they can attain this type of security by acquiring nuclear weapons as a deterrent to war.  
Waltz’s rationale is based on the fact that there has been a long peace, without a general 
war since 1945, which he attributes to the advent of nuclear weapons.  In a conventional 
war, states take risks based on expected outcomes which, even in defeat, indicate limited 
damage and suffering.  Nuclear wars, on the other hand, promise uncertainty and 
unimaginable devastation.  Therefore, based on the realist principle of self-preservation, 
it is unlikely that a state would use nuclear weapons knowing that retaliation may 
threaten its very existence.16 
The point of Waltz’s argument is that new states that acquire nuclear weapons – 
even those considered weak – are likely to act rationally for reasons previously 
mentioned.  Developing a nuclear weapons program is not cheap and takes a tremendous 
amount of time and national commitment.  Waltz simply does not accept the logic that a 
state, consisting of either a weak or radical government, would indiscriminately use 
nuclear weapons once it acquired them.  By taking such action, a state would lose the 
very deterrent that it had worked so hard to acquire.17  Regarding nuclear terrorism, he 
believes that states will act rationally and will not allow one of their nuclear weapons to 
get into the hands of terrorists.  He goes on to say, 
Fear of nuclear terror arises from the assumption that if terrorists can get 
nuclear weapons they will get them, and then all hell will break loose.  
This is comparable to assuming that if weak states get nuclear weapons, 
they will use them for aggression.  Both assumptions are false.18 
Even if terrorists acquired a nuclear weapon, he dismisses the possibility its use 
since they would have to come out of their safe havens to store, protect, and use 
it.  In so doing, they would make themselves a target and lose their deterrent 
potential.  Simply said, terrorists seek political gains that can only be achieved 
through the credibility of causing nuclear terrorism. 
Ultimately, Waltz argues that the largest nuclear states pose the greatest 
threat today.  These states spend entirely too much time preventing smaller states 
                                                 
16 Sagan and Waltz, 3-9.  
17 Ibid., 10-13. 
18 Ibid., 130. 
11 
from acquiring nuclear weapons, and less time on safeguarding their own nuclear 
arsenals.  By securing their own arsenals, large nuclear states may attain a greater 
degree of safety since smaller states have fewer weapons to secure.19   
3. U.S. and Russian Views of Proliferation – Pessimist or Optimist?     
Presidents Bush and Putin indicated their commitments to prevent the spread of 
nuclear weapons at the Signing of the nuclear arms treaty on May 24, 2002.  In a joint 
press conference, President Bush stated that,  
President Putin and I agree also that the greatest danger in this war [on 
terrorism] is the prospect of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass 
destruction. Our nations must spare no effort at preventing all forms of 
proliferation. And we discussed Iran in this context today. We'll work 
closely with each other on this very important issue.20 
President Putin then added, 
I will confirm what Mr. Bush has just said, and I agree with your 
evaluation of threats in this regard. Generally speaking, I believe that the 
problem of nonproliferation is one of the key problems as regards ensuring 
international security.21 
Their statements logically lead one to conclude that the United States and Russia share 
Scott Sagan’s pessimistic outlook of nuclear proliferation.  Both nations are represented 
on the IAEA Board of Governors and support the IAEA in its role as the United Nations’ 
nuclear watchdog agency.  However, in spite of their commitment to the nonproliferation 
regime, they are divided in their views of the Iranian nuclear program.  This was evident 
when Russia abstained from voting on a September 24, 2005, IAEA resolution, citing 
Iran for noncompliance with its safeguards agreement, and during the UN Security 
Council deliberations on Iran.22  
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Why are they divided over Iran?  In his February 2, 2005 State of the Union 
Address, President Bush stated that “we must confront regimes that continue to harbor 
terrorists and pursue weapons of mass murder.”  He later added, “Today, Iran remains the 
world's primary state sponsor of terror – pursuing nuclear weapons while depriving its 
people of the freedom they seek and deserve.”23  Russia, on the other hand, does not hold 
this view.  In fact, after meeting with Iranian Security Chief Hasan Rowhani on February 
18, 2005, President Putin stated,  
We are deeply convinced that the spread of nuclear arms across our planet 
does not help strengthen security either in the region or around the world. 
And the latest steps taken by Iran have convinced us that Iran does not 
intend to produce nuclear arms.  In this context, we will continue 
cooperation with Iran in all areas, including the nuclear energy field.24 
While Putin reiterated concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, his statement 
regarding Iran diverges from the view expressed by his American counterpart two weeks 
prior.  This division poses a significant problem for the IAEA and the nonproliferation 
regime. 
How can two superpowers, each with the largest nuclear arsenals and stated 
commitments to nonproliferation, be so divided over Iran’s nuclear ambitions?  Based on 
these presidential statements, it makes sense to conclude that the United States and 
Russia do share the same views of nuclear proliferation and subscribe to Scott Sagan’s 
pessimistic view of proliferation.  The most logical explanation for this division is that 
the United States and Russia have different threat perceptions of the Iranian nuclear 
program.  This topic is addressed in the sections to follow. 
C. STEPHEN WALT – WHAT DO STATES CONSIDER A THREAT? 
In order to understand why the United States feels threatened by Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions and Russia does not, this thesis turns to the work of Stephen Walt.  Walt 
emphasizes that threat perceptions play an important role in alliance formation.  While 
the issue dividing the United States and Russia is not about an “alliance” in the truest 
sense of the definition, Russia’s nuclear cooperation with Iran does provide a certain 
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“level of commitment and exchange of benefits for both parties,” absent the fears 
expressed by the United States.25  It is in this context that Walt’s work is used to help 
provide an explanation for the different threat perceptions of Iran’s nuclear program. 
Walt debunks the contemporary wisdom in the balance of power theory advocated 
by Kenneth Waltz.  He argues that states form alliances to balance against specific 
threats.  Whereas the balance of power theory focuses on alignment against another 
power, Walt discovered that it did not take into account the type of threat.  He further 
expounds on his theory by evaluating the level of threat that a state may pose to others, 
based on geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions.26 
Using Walt’s argument, it would appear that Russia has ample reason to fear 
nuclear cooperation with Iran, more so than the United States.  While Russia does not 
share a direct border with Iran, the two countries are geographically located within a few 
hundred kilometers of one another – separated only by Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan 
– as compared to the several thousand kilometers that separate the United States and Iran.  
Sergei Karaganov, Deputy Director of the Institute of Europe, Chairman of the Council 
for Foreign and Defense Policy, reiterated this point by stating, 
The problem is that acquisition of nuclear weapons by Tehran is 
unacceptable either for the region’s countries, or for the great powers, 
primarily for Russia, which is located in the direct proximity of Iran, and 
within reach of potential Iranian nuclear delivery vehicles.27 
Karaganov’s comments indicate that Russia should fear a nuclear-armed Iran just as 
much as the United States does, especially due to their geographical proximity.  Yet, 
Russia has not wavered in its nuclear cooperation with Iran.  One explanation for this is 
that Iran currently has limited offensive capabilities in its conventional forces and is, 
therefore, not deemed a threat. 
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The key source of disagreement, between the United States and Russia over Iran’s 
nuclear program, appears to be linked to Walt’s third level of threat criteria, that of 
“perceived intentions.”28  In the same article where he expressed concern over a nuclear-
armed Iran, Karaganov stated, “On the whole we have viewed and continue to view Iran 
as a friendly nation, and a potentially valuable geopolitical partner in the region.”29  
Herein lies the apparent contradiction.  On one hand, Russia cooperates with Iran on its 
nuclear program – knowing full well that the IAEA has passed a resolution indicating that 
Iran had violated its safeguards agreement – yet states concern over a nuclear armed Iran.  
The only logical explanation for this apparent contradiction is that Russia truly perceives 
that Iran will not act in any hostile way towards Russia.  As Walt states, “Perceptions of 
intent are likely to play an especially crucial role in alliance choices.”30  So, for the 
present time, Russia, although not in a formal security alliance with Iran, appears to be 
reaping the mutual benefit of nuclear cooperation with Iran.  This brings us back to our 
original question: Why do the United States and Russia have such varying threat 
perceptions of the Iranian nuclear program?  The answer to this question is addressed in 
the section below. 
D. ROBERT JERVIS – ARE THREAT PERCEPTIONS IMPORTANT? 
To explain the opposing views of Iran’s nuclear program, this section will explore 
the work of Robert Jervis, a prominent scholar who has written on the psychological 
factors in perception.  The significance of Jervis’ work in international politics is that he 
emphasizes the importance that perception has on decision-making.  Whereas Walt 
emphasized that perception was important in alliance formation, Jervis goes one step 
further by looking at the psychological factors affecting perception.  In particular, he 
argues that perceptions are extremely important in evaluating the actions of others, and 
possibly, whether they are considered a threat.31  This line of reasoning is particularly 
important in exploring the opposing views of Iran. 
                                                  
28 Walt, 5.    
29 Karaganov, “Iran: Last Chance But One.” 
30 Walt, 25. 
31 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), 6-10. 
15 
1. Do Perceptions Matter? 
The previous section concluded that Russia and the United States have different 
threat perceptions of the Iranian nuclear program.  Although this conclusion provides a 
good reference point, it also raises some important questions.  Do perceptions really 
matter in the course of international affairs?  Does it matter that two countries have 
different perceptions of another’s intentions?  The answer to these questions should be 
intuitively obvious.  According to Jervis, “Judging others’ intentions is notoriously 
difficult.”32  The implication of his statement is that misjudging others’ intentions is 
dangerous.  Wars have erupted over misread signals or misperceived actions and 
intentions of another nation.  For example, the United States did not perceive Japan 
would act in such a hostile manner to the oil embargo, any more than Japan expected an 
all out war with the United States after the bombing of Pearl Harbor.33 
In the case of Iran, the stakes are equally high.  While the disagreement over 
Iran’s nuclear ambitions remains a key issue of diplomacy at the IAEA, it has the 
potential to escalate if a consensus is not achieved.  President Bush has stated that “all 
options are on the table” to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.34  Ultimately, 
this has the potential to create a crisis if diplomacy fails and the United States acts either 
unilaterally or with a small coalition against Iran, because Russia views Iran as a 
“friendly nation” with peaceful nuclear ambitions.35  Clearly, perceptions do matter.     
2. Where Do Perceptions Come From?  
While knowing that perceptions are important, it is also worthwhile to understand 
how perceptions are formed.  In this regard, the work of Robert Jervis cannot be 
underestimated.  He not only emphasizes the role that threat perceptions have on decision 
makers, but more importantly, he explains how decision makers learn or acquire these 
perceptions.  By understanding their own biases or cognitive tendencies, it may be 
possible to explain why decision makers act as they do.  As Jervis put it, “what one learns 
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from key events in international history is an important factor in determining the images 
that shape the interpretation of incoming information.”36  It is this interpretive process 
that shapes a decision maker’s or state’s view of the world around it, and ultimately their 
policies.  Recall in a previous section how Scott Sagan explained the differences in views 
held by Kenneth Waltz and himself by stating, “Our different visions of international 
politics have led us to develop very different interpretations of our nuclear past and very 
different predictions of the nuclear future.”37 
In the course of everyday life, people experience a variety of stimuli and 
information that they must process and use to govern their daily actions.  Some of this 
information may be stored away and deemed unimportant, while other bits may be 
classified as significant.  The cognitive process of learning, or processing of information 
as important or unimportant, has a definite impact on how people see and relate to the 
world around them.  What causes something to be deemed more important than 
something else?  According to Jervis, “people pay the most attention to what happens to 
them and those they identify with.”38  He lists four events from which people learn the 
most and are likely to shape their future predispositions: 39 
• Firsthand Experiences – Strong images are shaped by seeing and 
experiencing something first hand.  Just as eyewitness accounts can vary, 
cognitive predispositions can shape how an event is interpreted and used.  
• Early Experiences or Generational Effects – People typically learn more in 
their early adult life that can shape their policies later in their careers.  
Sometimes it is only the most recent events that matter, however, since 
there is such a long gap between early adult experiences and the age that 
they enter political office and are capable of formulating policies.  
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• Events Important to the Person’s State or Organization – Typically, a 
revolution, or the last war, has a tremendous impact on how decision 
makers respond to new sources of conflict. 
• Range of Available Alternative Analogies – The fewer significant events a 
decision-maker has to draw from, the greater the potential to misinterpret 
future occurrences.  Conversely, decision makers with a much greater 
experience base are less likely to be influenced by a single event and have 
much more to draw from in execution of policies. 
Ultimately, it is the type of learning that has a tremendous impact on how decision 
makers perceive the world around them. 
3. What Impact Do Perceptions Have on Decision Makers? 
Understanding international relations is a very complex, dynamic process, shaped 
by the actions and reactions of various actors.  Decision-makers often rely on their 
predispositions of others to shape their own actions; due to their own biases, however, 
they may not get a complete picture of the world around them.  Jervis presents two views 
that may help explain opposing U.S. and Russian threat perceptions of Iran.  First, he 
states,   
The decision maker who thinks that the other side is probably hostile will 
see ambiguous information confirming this image, whereas the same 
information about a country thought to be friendly would be taken more 
benignly.40 
Second, he notes that,  
Under other circumstances, states will be motivated to perceive a threat as 
smaller or less troublesome than it actually is.  When statesmen become 
committed to a given policy, they will feel strong psychological pressures 
to perceive that the threats they face can be overcome.41 
As noted, there are inherent problems with a state’s threat perceptions of others.  Only by 
realizing the tendency to attribute biases in its threat perceptions of others, can a state 
gain a clearer picture of the dangers at hand.    
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So why do the United States and Russia differ so widely in their threat 
perceptions of Iran’s nuclear program?  As previously mentioned, both nations 
acknowledge their concerns with, and the risks associated with, proliferation.  Both have 
a pessimistic outlook for the future of proliferation.  Both nations have been on favorable 
and unfavorable terms with Iran through the years, and both have contributed to the 
building of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.  At this point, it would seem that the United 
States and Russia have different threat perceptions of Iran, shaped by their dealings with 
the Islamic Republic and affected by their willingness to proliferation.  Russia sees Iran 
as a peaceful nation and the United States does not.  Russia does not acknowledge a 
problem cooperating with Iran on its civilian nuclear program, whereas the United States 
does.  The remainder of this thesis tests this hypothesis in light of the historical record. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The next three chapters examine the empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis 
that the differences in the United States’ and Russia’s view of Iran can be explained 
through their historical relations with the Islamic Republic.  The United States’ and 
Russia’s relations with Iran may yield clues as to why they have different threat 
perceptions of the Islamic Republic, and hence, attitudes towards nuclear proliferation.  
Major cleavages in relations may help explain why their threat perceptions have changed 
through the years.  If these anticipated links hold true, it may explain the opposing 
positions that the two nations have taken at the IAEA regarding Iran. 
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III. RUSSIAN – IRANIAN RELATIONS:  1953–2005 
Although Russia has expressed concern about Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, 
Moscow continues to support Iran’s nuclear energy program – in spite of repeated 
criticism from the international community.  In an interview with Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, Vladimir Orlov, director of the Center for Policy Studies in 
Moscow, indicated that cooperation with Iran is not without scrutiny or limitations, but 
that “so far we see peaceful intentions by Iran.”42  This position placed Russia at odds 
with the majority of the IAEA members who cited Iran’s safeguards violations in 
September 2005, and members of the Security Council who pressed for economic 
sanctions.  By taking such actions, the international community signaled that it did not 
view Iran’s intentions as entirely peaceful.  What explains Russia’s opposing view?  
Using the logic of Jervis, Russia’s peaceful perception of Iran was formed through 
learning that took place during “key events in international history.”43 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain Russia’s rationale for cooperating with 
Iran and why its threat perceptions of the Iranian nuclear program are so different from 
those held by the United States.  Using Jervis’ theory on how threat perceptions are 
formed, this chapter analyzes Russian – Iranian relations from 1953 to 2005, focusing on 
the evolution of relations with regard to economic, nuclear, and strategic interests.  
Through a critical analysis of their past and present relations, this chapter provides one 
part of the framework to help explain the different threat perceptions that the two nuclear 
superpowers hold.  By understanding these differences, U.S. policy-makers may be able 
to devise a better plan of engagement to curtail Iran’s nuclear ambitions. 
A. 1953–1979:  BALANCING EAST AGAINST WEST 
As tensions grew early in the Cold War, the Soviet Union realized that Iran held a 
strategic position on its southern frontier and, therefore, pursued a two-pronged foreign 
policy approach to counter American imperialism.  By pursuing “state-to-state and 
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Communist Party to Communist Party” relations with Iran, the Soviets could openly 
express their intent for goodwill, while engaging in subversive tactics to undermine the 
regime.44  Realizing that the Iranians harbored feelings of ill will due to the Soviet’s 
refusal to pull their troops out after World War II – and due to subversive activities of the 
Communist Tudeh Party – Soviet Premier Georgi Malenkov highlighted his plan for 
rapprochement with Iran to the Supreme Soviet on August 8, 1953:   
The experience of three and a half decades has shown mutual friendship 
and co-operation are in the interests of the Soviet Union and Iran.  Hence, 
there is a firm basis for Soviet-Iranian relations, which makes it possible 
to settle issues arising between the two parties to their mutual 
satisfaction....Whether Soviet-Iranian relations will develop on good 
neighborly lines, on the lines of extension of commercial and cultural 
intercourse, depends on the Iranian government.45 
The Soviets did not view Iran as a threat by itself, but did, however, feel threatened by 
Iranian alignment with the United States.  The last thing the Soviets wanted was to have 
their imperialist rival establish a foothold on their southern frontier.46 
1. U.S. Coup and Soviet Reaction 
About the same time Malenkov was extending an outstretched hand to Teheran, 
the United States began to initiate a coup to remove Prime Minister Mohammad 
Mosaddeq and reinstate the Shah to the throne.  This coup was executed primarily over 
fears that Iranian nationalism would play into the hands of the Iranian Tudeh Party, and 
ultimately lead to a Communist government.  Although this was not a welcomed move in 
Moscow, the Soviets did little more than express verbal opposition, blasting the United 
States for creating a puppet government.  In spite of their protests, Moscow continued to 
seek friendly relations with Iran.  A few weeks after the coup, the Soviets had reason to 
rejoice when a long-awaited agreement to increase trade with Iran was reached on 
September 3, 1953.47  For now, the Soviets were content with the status quo. 
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Feelings of good will soon shifted when Iran signed the Baghdad Pact on 
November 3, 1956, effectively tilting the balance away from the Soviets once again.  
Moscow viewed this as an act of aggression since it contained an implied security 
commitment from the United States, accompanied with provisions for military equipment 
sales.  The Soviets vacillated between coercion and diplomacy to get Iran to denounce 
this threatening agreement and pressured Iran, without success, to sign a fifty-year 
nonaggression pact.  When Iraq pulled out of the Baghdad Pact in 1958, the remaining 
countries, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran, renamed it the Central Treaty Organization 
(CENTO).  While not a formal member of CENTO, the United States signed bilateral 
security agreements with each country in 1959, further adding to Soviet hostility.48   
2. The Scales Tilt East 
At the start of the 1960s, Soviet-Iranian relations remained cold – until the Shah 
had a falling out with the United States following an April 1962 visit.  When the 
Kennedy Administration announced a cutback in military and economic aid, the Shah 
decided to improve Iran’s neighborly relations with the Soviets based on mutual respect.  
As a conciliatory gesture of good will, the Iranian Foreign Minister, Aram Abbas, sent a 
letter to the Soviet ambassador on September 15, 1962, indicating that Iran agreed to a 
nonaggression arrangement and that it would not permit the stationing of Western nuclear 
missiles on its territory.49  The Soviets feared such stationing and were more concerned 
about the threat posed by American forces than the threat posed by Iran.  Up until this 
point, the Shah was perceived as little more than an American puppet who acted only in 
Washington’s interest, a view consistent with Jervis’ reasoning that “statesmen are often 
more worried about how the other acts than about what it does.”50  Thus, the Shah’s 
pledge was a welcomed gesture in Moscow, where the perception signaled a 
psychological break with Washington, and served as a turning point in Soviet – Iranian 
relations.51 
                                                 
48 George Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East (Washington: American Institute for 
Public Policy Research, 1972), 30.  See also Martin Sicker, The Bear and the Lion, 86-90. 
49 Sicker, 92-93.  See also, Keddie and Gasiorowski, 71.  
50 Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 14-15. 
51 Sicker, 93.  
22 
The Soviets subsequently sent a delegation to Teheran on December 19, headed 
by Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Lapin, to “discuss cultural, economic, and technical 
cooperation.”52  As a token of good will, the Soviets agreed to reopen a land route for 
Iran to use through the Soviet Union to Western Europe.  This was a significant economic 
concession for the Iranians since 65 percent of their total trade was with Western Europe.  
The following summer, they agreed to help construct a hydroelectric plant on the 
bordering Aras River.  In November, Leonid Brezhnev made his first official visit, 
concluding key technical and economic agreements to reaffirm Moscow’s commitment to 
improve relations, and to signal approval for Soviet bloc countries to follow suit.53   
Relations continued to improve after the Shah’s June 1965 state visit to Moscow, 
where they reached even more trade agreements.54  The timing of this visit was of 
particular significance to the Soviets, since the United States had ceased to provide 
military and economic aid to Iran.  By focusing on economic ties, the Soviets planned to 
gain greater influence in Iran and achieve the upper hand over their Cold War rival.  In 
January 1966, Iran agreed to sell “up to 10,000 billion cubit meters of natural gas per year 
between 1970 and 1985” to the Soviets.  This opened up an entirely new industry in Iran, 
since gas was normally burned off during oil production.  In return, the Soviets agreed to 
build a 42-inch gas pipeline from Iran’s “Khuzistan fields to the Soviet border west of the 
Caspian Sea.”55  This served Soviet interests well by substituting gas for domestic oil 
usage, thereby allowing the sale of excess oil on the open market.  The natural gas deal 
also provided the means for Iran to pay for some of the $110 million in Soviet military 
equipment it had ordered in the form of vehicles and small arms in January 1967.  The 
significance of this arms deal was that it was the first such agreement between the Soviet 
Union and any member of an active Western defense agreement.  Thus, it effectively 
indicated the dual nature of Iran’s foreign policy of purchasing military supplies from 
both the United States and the Soviet Union.56 
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3. Separating Politics and Economics 
While their level of cooperation may have indicated warm relations, their actions 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s caused a certain degree of suspicion and mistrust.  The 
British departure from the Persian Gulf region created a power vacuum that the Soviets 
did not want replaced unless it was in accordance with their strategic plans.  Iran initially 
went along with this plan and remained neutral until the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia 
in 1968.  This hostile action caused the Shah to question the Soviet’s true intentions in 
the Gulf, and effectively swayed him back to the side of Washington.  During a visit in 
October 1969, the Shah received the “go ahead” from President Nixon to assume more of 
a regional role for stability in the Middle East, which had been his long-time goal.  
Although this move disturbed the Soviets, they continued bilateral relations as if nothing 
had happened.  When the Soviets signed a cooperation agreement with India on August 9, 
1971, to contain China, it threatened Iran’s influence in the Indian Ocean and so the Shah 
countered by forging his own agreement with the Peoples Republic of China.  Moscow 
did not expect this move and subsequently decided to rethink their strategy for Iran.  To 
further complicate relations, Iran learned that the Soviets had forged a friendship treaty 
with Iraq and would gain access to a naval facility in return; this had the unintended 
consequence of causing Iran to further strengthen ties with the United States.57   
Despite these setbacks, the Soviets continued to focus on economic relations.  In 
April 1974, the Soviets agreed to build a second natural gas pipeline (IGAT-2).  This 
agreement stressed the strategic importance of their economic relations and allowed Iran 
to begin selling natural gas to Austria, Czechoslovakia, France and West Germany at the 
Soviet border.  To secure a steady supply of natural gas to Transcaucasia, the Soviets 
even agreed to absorb the cost of shipping the gas from the border to the areas where Iran 
would market it.58  During the Shah’s visit to Moscow in November 1974, Nikolai 
Podgorny, President of the Presidium of the Soviet Union, made a key statement. 
Relations between the USSR and Iran continue to develop and strengthen 
steadily.  The Soviet-Iranian cooperation is built on the solid foundation of 
mutual respect, equality, noninterference in the affairs of each other…The 
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policy of friendship and good neighborliness pursued by our countries in 
their relations is that of peaceful coexistence in action.59 
In this statement, the Soviets publicly reaffirmed their desire to focus on economic 
relations with Iran, an area where they knew Western influence was the weakest. 
4. Mirage in the Desert 
By 1978, the Soviets began to change their tactics with Iran.  In late 1978, 
General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev publicly supported the Shah while the Soviet-backed 
Voice of Iran radio in Azerbaijan called for his overthrow and replacement by an Islamic 
government.60  Up to this point, the Soviets and Iranians had signed economic 
agreements based on good neighborly relations irrespective of political ideology.  The 
Soviets tolerated the Shah’s regime primarily because he pursued an “acceptable” foreign 
policy.  Even though Iran had a strong military and was politically oriented towards the 
United States, the Soviets did not have any reason to fear Iran’s intentions since its forces 
were primarily oriented towards the South.61  As the Shah’s domestic support faded and 
it was apparent that his pro-Western regime would crumble, Moscow changed its rhetoric 
in November 1978, and publicly called for the Shah’s overthrow.  Moscow even warned 
the United States not to interfere in Iran’s internal affairs, fearing U.S. involvement 
similar to what it had done in 1953.62 
The Soviets were cautious of the Islamic revolution’s ideological differences from 
Communism, but quickly embraced its anti-American sentiment.  Ayatollah Khomeini 
systematically removed all barriers that had served as impediments to improved relations 
with the Shah’s regime; he pulled Iran out of the 1959 CENTO agreement and declared a 
nonaligned policy in the East – West conflict.  In addition, he allowed the Tudeh Party, 
formerly illegal under the Shah, to operate in the open; this move prompted Moscow to 
change the Tudeh’s leadership and order support for the Islamic movement.  With U.S. 
influence declining, the Soviets viewed rapprochement with Iran extremely optimistic.63 
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It did not take long before Soviet optimism began to fade after Khomeini’s 
February 1, 1979 arrival in Teheran.  Moscow reaffirmed Khomeini’s deep-rooted 
suspicion two days after he met with the Soviet ambassador, reminding Iran that their 
1921 Treaty authorizes the Soviets to intervene in the affairs of its southern neighbor if 
the border was threatened.  While the Soviets may have been trying to justify their 
“imperialist” actions in Afghanistan, Khomeini became all the more critical.  To alleviate 
Khomeini’s concern, Leonid Brezhnev issued a public statement of good will on March 
3, 1979, as follows: 
We wish the new revolutionary Iran success and prosperity and hope that 
relations of good neighborliness between the peoples of the Soviet Union 
and Iran will fruitfully develop in the new conditions on the firm 
foundations of mutual respect, goodwill and non-interference in each 
other’s internal affairs.64 
The only response Brezhnev received was Khomeini’s continued criticism of the Soviet’s 
support for a Communist take-over in Afghanistan, where he urged Moscow not to 
interfere in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.65  However, this was not enough to deter the 
Soviet Union’s full-scale invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, which further 
exacerbated Khomeini’s criticism and mistrust. 
B. 1980–1991:  UNEXPECTED PATH TO RAPPROCHEMENT 
Although Iranian distrust of Soviet intentions remained a constant obstacle to 
improved relations in the 1980s, the Soviets had learned the importance of staying the 
course in their attempts to gain influence in Iran.  Prior to the revolution, the Soviet 
Union was Iran’s largest export market for manufactured goods, whereas Iran was the 
Soviet’s largest market for non-military goods in the Middle East.66  After Iranian 
revolutionaries seized the United States Embassy and took U.S. and Canadian diplomats 
hostage in November 1979, Leonid Brezhnev feared U.S. involvement once again and 
warned the United States, in January 1980, not to interfere in Iran’s internal affairs.  
While he meant to calm Iranian mistrust of the Soviet Union with his warning, it had the 
opposite effect.  Iran became alarmed that a U.S. threat may trigger a Soviet invasion, 
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authorized under the 1921 Treaty that was upheld by Moscow and renounced by 
Khomeini.  In fact, Khomeini’s suspicion and distrust for the Soviets was clearly evident 
in his labeling of the Soviet Union as the “other Great Satan.”67      
1. Dangerous Courtship 
The Soviets achieved great success penetrating Iran through economic and trade 
agreements, and believed this was still the best policy under the circumstances.  Iranian 
oil production decreased following the revolution, directly impacting the amount of 
natural gas available.  When the Soviets refused to pay a five-fold price increase in 
natural gas, Iran cut off all shipments to the Soviet Union on April 6, 1980, causing 
serious shortages in the adjoining territories.  In retaliation, Moscow terminated Iran’s 
ability to ship products destined for European markets across its territories.  Iran quickly 
learned that it was in no position to sever economic ties with the Soviet Union, especially 
since it was suffering from a U.S. economic embargo.  As a result, the Iranian Minister of 
Economy and Finance traveled to Moscow to work out a new agreement, signed later on 
September 16, 1980.  After some delay, the Soviets did restore transit rights, even though 
Iran never reciprocated on the shipment of natural gas.68              
Although the situation in Afghanistan continued to affect their relations, the 
Soviet Union decided to take an “official” position of neutrality when Iraq invaded Iran 
on September 22, 1980.  Iran welcomed this change, since the Soviets had previously 
sided with Iraq during the 1974–1975 Iraq-Iran conflict due to a friendship treaty.69  One 
possible explanation for the Soviet position was that the border facilities could not keep 
up with the heavy volume of Iranian goods shipped across the Soviet territories when the 
war started.70  Clearly, Moscow recognized that it was important not distance itself too 
far from Iran at this time and tolerated Iran’s accusations that the Soviets were secretly 
selling arms and providing military advisors to Iraq.  In February 1981, Leonid Brezhnev 
“reiterated the Soviet desire to develop good relations with Iran based on reciprocity” and 
“heralded the Iranian revolution as profoundly anti-imperialist” while speaking at the 
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Twenty-Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.  The two countries 
followed this gesture of good will in July by signing agreements to allow indirect sales of 
arms, commercial trade, and Soviet military advisors to go to Iran. 71         
2. Risky Business 
As the Soviets openly proclaimed their good will towards Iran, the Tudeh Party 
was engaged in subversive activities at the bequest of Moscow.  In May 1982, it was 
estimated that hundreds of KGB Farsi speaking agents were working in Iran; later that 
year the number had jumped to nearly 2,000.  It was clear that Moscow was working 
doubly hard to secure its interests with its southern neighbor.  In a drastic turn of events, 
several party leaders were arrested as KGB spies in February 1983, followed by the 
expulsion of eighteen Soviet diplomats for spying on May 18.  That same day, Ayatollah 
Khomeini outlawed the Tudeh once again and had hundreds more of its members 
rounded up and arrested.  Moscow reacted by withdrawing many of its technical experts 
from Iran’s industrial base, which caused a severe hardship for Iran.  In addition, 
Moscow decided to turn its support to Iraq when it became apparent that Iran was on the 
offensive.  Surprisingly, in spite of their openly provocative rhetoric, the Soviets and 
Iranians continued to expand their commercial economic ties.72 
Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985 and began promoting his new thinking 
towards Soviet policy.  Although his position on Iran did not change significantly, he 
wanted to expand bilateral economic cooperation and was united with Iran’s opposition 
to the United States’ military presence in the Gulf.73  Consequently, his position may 
have caused Iran to view rapprochement in a more positive light.  Iran had previously 
viewed the Soviets with contempt, since they expressed little concern for Iraqi aggression 
and the Tudeh subversion indicated Moscow violated its pledge of noninterference.  As 
the Iran-Iraq War raged on, however, Teheran recognized its need of economic and 
military assistance.  Thus, it was no surprise when the Iranians warmly received Soviet 
Deputy Prime Minister Georgi Kornyenko in Teheran on February 26, 1986, and agreed 
to “expand economic and trade relations, and to conduct joint oil exploration in the 
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Caspian Sea.”  The Soviet Oil minister followed in August, at which time Iran agreed to 
resume the natural gas exports to the Soviet Union that had been halted in 1980.74 
3. Rapprochement at Last 
During the 1980s, Soviet – Iranian relations were strained primarily for two 
reasons: Soviet support for Iraq and its invasion of Afghanistan.  Mikhail Gorbachev 
removed the first obstacle by tilting Soviet support back towards Iran in 1987 as a 
friendly gesture to improve economic ties, which improved even more after the war 
officially ended on August 20, 1988.  He removed the second obstacle by ceasing 
operations in Afghanistan and beginning the withdrawal of Soviet troops in December 
1988, a key event that signified the end of Islamic oppression.  In essence, Gorbachev set 
the stage for the two countries to engage in meaningful dialogue; his efforts paid off 
when Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze visited Teheran on February 26, 
1989, and was received by Ayatollah Khomeini.  When the visit was over, Shevardnadze 
declared this to be an historic “turning point” in relations between the Soviet Union and 
Iran.75 
The significance of this “turning point” is vital to understanding Russia’s current 
perceptions of Iran.  To begin with, this was the first time a Soviet Foreign Minister had 
visited the Islamic Republic of Iran since the revolution.  Second, Ayatollah Khomeini 
personally received Shevardnadze, a privilege never afforded to any other Foreign 
Minister.76  Whereas Khomeini had formerly denounced the Soviet Union as one of 
Iran’s foreign devils, he now called for “greater cooperation between the two countries to 
combat the devilish acts of the west.”77  Third, Iranian Majlis (Parliamentary) Speaker 
Hashemi-Rafsanjani reciprocated with a trip to Moscow in June 1989, and concluded a 
number of trade, military sales, and economic agreements.  A joint communiqué was then 
issued, detailing their intent for further cooperation to include collaboration on the  
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“peaceful use of nuclear energy.”  Mikhail Gorbachev was even quoted as saying “the 
Soviets maintain that the positive impacts of the visit would shortly be felt throughout the 
world.”78 
The events at the beginning of the 1990s continued to fuel their cooperative 
relationship.  Iran faced a security dilemma when the United States increased its military 
presence in the Gulf due to the war against Iraq.  As Western influence entered the region 
once again, Iran could do little more than watch as the United States gained a foothold in 
the Gulf.  Once a regional power, due in part to the Shah’s acquisition of U.S. military 
hardware, Iran’s military might, and air fleet in particular, had been degraded during its 
war with Iraq.  Iran desired to be a regional power once again and wanted to expel the 
Westerners once again.  This fueled Iran’s desire to regain its former military status in the 
Gulf to defy the West; this desire significantly increased its dependence on Soviet 
military equipment.79  As for the Soviets, they were focused on improving their economic 
situation and desired to regain their influence in Iran.  Thus, both nations benefited when 
they concluded a one billion dollar arms deal in 1991.80 
C. 1992–1999:  SHIFTING PRIORITIES 
President Boris Yeltsin’s foreign policy in the 1990s seemed inconsistent and 
disjointed, which was not totally unexpected considering that a 70-year-old empire broke 
apart and left Yeltsin to deal with its aftermath.  In general, his policies in the 1990s 
aimed at improving relations with the West, exploiting oil in the Caspian Sea, 
maintaining relations with Iran which may have deterred Iranian Islamic interests in 
Central Asia, generating hard currency from arms and nuclear reactor sales, and 
countering NATO expansion.81  While his foreign policy appears inconsistent, it must be 
noted that Yeltsin faced tremendous internal pressures from various interest groups that 
ultimately swayed his priorities. 
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Russia and Iran did not always see eye-to-eye in the 1990s, but remained 
committed to improving relations.  When the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991, 
Russia faced a different domestic and international system.  It was now surrounded by 
fourteen new states, four of which were Muslim; Azerbaijan was in Transcaucasia, and 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan were in Central Asia.82  Since Islam was 
suppressed under Soviet rule, Russia initially feared that Iran would spread Islamic 
radicalism to these new states due to their close proximity to the Middle East, or possibly 
impact Russia’s 17 million practicing Muslims.83  However, Kenneth Katzman points out 
that “the lack of strong Islamic movements in most of the new Muslim states does not 
adequately explain Iran’s unexpected lack of political activism to its north.”84  He further 
adds, “Iranian policy makers appear to have concluded that they cannot risk offending 
Russia.”85 
Despite Russia’s initial fears that Iran may not act responsibly, Iran gave Russia 
no reason to perceive ill intentions.  Iranian President Rafsanjani was overly careful not 
to alienate Moscow while the Soviet Union was breaking up, and always focused on 
economic ties while downplaying the role of Islam.  He even delayed recognizing 
Azerbaijan’s independence, declared in November 1991, until after the Soviet Union had 
dissolved in December.  This was essentially how Rafsanjani indicated to Moscow that 
Iran wanted to base their relationship on economics ties, and not Islam.  Thus, with little 
reason to perceive hostile intentions from Iran, Russia felt it was safe to supply arms to 
Iran while furthering economic ties with the Islamic Republic.86 
In 1992, Iran and Russia signed contracts that would have a significant bearing on 
their long-term relations.  One was a significant arms contract valued in the range of $4–
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10 billion over a five-year period.  It appears that the items contained in this contract 
stemmed from their 1989 agreement to sell arms; included were three Kilo class 
submarines, T-72 tanks, MiG 29 and Su-24 Aircraft, missile launchers, and long-range 
guns.  The second aspect of these contracts focused on Russia’s commitment to continue 
assisting Iran in the development of its steel and petroleum industries.  Third, they signed 
an agreement to create a joint economic commission to encourage further economic ties.  
Finally, Iran reaffirmed its intent to approach Transcaucasia and Central Asian states 
“through the Moscow door” and not to promote Islamic radicalism there.87  Once again, 
Iran reaffirmed its desire to be a good neighbor. 
1. Disjointed Policies and Business 
President Yeltsin’s desire to reform the Russian economy was reflected in much 
of his foreign policy.  As previously mentioned, he wanted to improve his relations with 
the West, in addition to maintaining relations with Iran.  Even though the United States 
criticized Yeltsin for selling arms to Iran, the Russian economy was in dire need of hard 
currency and Iran, more than any other nation in the Middle East, had it to give.  In fact, 
Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev visited the Gulf Cooperation Council in April 1992, 
and stated, “We have created a huge military-industrial complex.  And now we need to 
find profitable markets for selling Russian armaments.”  He went on to state that “[w]e 
had to assert ourselves in the region, to show that Russia remains a great power that is 
prepared to engage in mutually beneficial cooperation, that it is not standing there with an 
outstretched hand.”88  The bottom line is that the Russians discovered that selling arms 
was a very lucrative business and could generate the hard currency needed back home.  
As President Yeltsin tried to find a delicate balance between Iran and the West, his critics 
back home attacked him for being too pro-West and wanted him to take a more 
independent policy towards the Middle East.89 
On the surface, President Yeltsin’s decision to invade Chechnya in December 
1994 would have appeared to arouse an Iranian response similar to that of Afghanistan.  
While Iran did react to the poor treatment of Muslims, its was a weak response that 
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seemed to indicate either a respect for Russia’s internal affairs, or a more pressing desire 
not to damage relations with Moscow.  In fact, it probably had a lot to do with Moscow’s 
1993 promise to sell nuclear reactors to Iran, which would satisfy a long-term desire to 
obtain nuclear technology.90  In January 1995, Russia did sign a contract to install an 
$800 million nuclear reactor in Iran’s Bushehr province.91  This was a hot topic during 
the May 1995 Clinton – Yeltsin Summit held in Moscow.  Although President Clinton 
vehemently opposed the nuclear proliferation aspect of this contract, Yeltsin would not 
back down on his commitment to sell nuclear technology to Iran.  Yeltsin’s other motive 
was to use his strategic relationship with Iran to counter NATO’s Eastward expansion.92   
President Yeltsin’s defiant position in response to Western pressure gained him a 
political victory in Moscow, while affirming Russia’s commitment to maintain closer 
relations with Iran.  It must be noted that Yeltsin did make some serious concessions to 
the West, as evident in a Heritage Foundation report that states: 
Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin 
on June 30, 1995, signed a confidential agreement that was supposed to 
limit Moscow’s sales of arms to Iran.  Russia agreed to supply only 
weapons specified under the 1989 Soviet-Iranian military agreements and 
promised not to deliver advanced conventional or “destabilizing” weapons 
to Iran.  Finally, Russia agreed not to sell any weapons to Iran beyond 
December 31, 1999.93 
Although this appeared to affect Russian – Iranian relations, Russia’s pullout from 
Chechnya in 1996, and the 1997 delivery of three Kilo class submarines and other arms 
that had been sold to Iran in 1992, seemed to negate any potential fallout.94   
2. Trouble at Home 
As the 1990s drew to a close, Russian – Iranian relations remained strong due to 
their economic ties, even though disagreements occurred.  Muhammad Khatami’s 
election as the President of Iran in May 1997 did affect their relations when he attempted 
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to open up dialogue with the United States.  This was not something Moscow needed, 
especially when the 1998 economic crisis hit.  Russia knew it needed economic 
assistance from the West, but could not risk losing its economic foothold in the Middle 
East.95  Complicating matters further, Russia invaded Chechnya once again in 1999 to 
put an end to terrorist activities and Islamic extremism.  This time, however, Iran stepped 
up its public criticism as the intensity of the conflict escalated.  In a public statement, the 
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman expressed Iran’s displeasure as follows: 
The Islamic Republic of Iran, while honoring Russia’s territorial integrity, 
does not regard violent and hostile acts as a suitable way of dealing with 
recent incidents in Chechnya and Daghestan.  The government and people 
of Iran cannot but deplore the continued armed operation by the Russian 
troops in the Northern Caucasus.96 
In response, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov “politely” responded by saying, “[w]e 
are concerned over the attitude of Islamic countries to the events in Chechnya.  However, 
it is a domestic Russian problem, and we intend to settle it independently, without any aid 
or interference.”97  While Iran publicly acknowledged the injustice to Muslims abroad, it 
needed good relations with Moscow to ensure completion of the Bushehr nuclear reactor 
sometime after 2000.  Russia, on the other hand, had reasserted itself and defied 
interference in its domestic affairs. 
D. 2000–2005:  FULL SPEED AHEAD 
Russian – Iranian relations would take a turn for the better at the end of 1999 
when Vladimir Putin succeeded Boris Yeltsin as Russia’s President.  Putin’s actions were 
very clear and he obviously intended to maintain his close relationship with Iran.  While 
Yeltsin’s relations with Iran were politically motivated, Putin chose to emphasize 
relations as more of an economic business venture.98  In addition, Putin also 
acknowledged that greater cooperation with the West would be necessary as he pursued 
better economic relations with Iran and the international community.99 
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1. Putin’s New Direction 
In November 2000, President Putin made a significant step to boost Russia’s 
relations with Iran by renouncing the 1995 Gore – Chernomyrdin Agreement not to sell 
conventional arms to Iran.100  This paved the way for Russian Defense Minister Igor 
Sergeev to visit Teheran in December 2000 to discuss resuming the sale of arms.  This 
trip was significant in that it was the first time a Russian Defense Minister had visited 
Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.  Over a ten-year period, Sergeev and his Iranian 
counterpart discussed arms sales valued at more than three billion dollars.  In addition, 
Sergeev dismissed Western pressure by indicating that Russia would conduct its affairs as 
a means to accomplish its own ends.101 
Following Sergeev’s visit to Teheran, Iranian President Khatami accepted Putin’s 
offer and made an official visit to Moscow in March 2001.  Of particular importance, 
Khatami indicated his desire to purchase more diesel-powered submarines to boost his 
naval power in the Gulf.102  In addition, he expressed interest in acquiring TOR-M1 
surface-to-air missiles and might be interested in purchasing an additional nuclear 
reactor.103  While this was good news to the Russians, the West was critical.  For the 
Russians, it was purely a matter of economics, at least on the surface.  They inherited a 
large arms industry from the Soviet Union and planned to use the sales revenue to 
reinvest in advanced technology.   
Russia faced other events in 2001 that affected its foreign relations.  The first 
event was the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. World Trade Centers and 
Pentagon.  In spite of his differences with the West, Putin reached out and embraced the 
American call to support a coalition against terrorism.104  In some ways, this placed 
Russia in a precarious situation, since the U.S. had labeled Iran as a member of the “axis 
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of evil” due to its sponsorship of international terrorism.105  Though he did not give into 
Western pressure, Putin did try to work a delicate balance with Russia’s relations to the 
West and Iran.106  The second event was when Russia “officially” ceased operations in 
Chechnya and began pulling out its troops in December 2001, which was a welcomed 
move in Teheran due to ill treatment of Muslims. 
2. The Economic Link 
In terms of economic cooperation, the Caspian Sea is source of friction and a 
region of great importance for Russia and Iran.  In April 2002, Turkmenistan hosted the 
first summit of the Caspian nations to reconcile differences on how to divide resources 
between the five bordering nations.107  Although Presidents Putin and Khatami were both 
present, the summit did not produce a meaningful agreement.  Iran shares only 13 percent 
of the Caspian’s shoreline, yet proposed equal division of the Caspian to the five 
adjoining nations, giving 20 percent to each nation.  Russia, on the other hand, proposed 
a division based on shoreline boundaries.  Despite this difference, Putin stated that 
“Russia's relations with Iran have strengthened” and that “Russia decided to participate in 
the Caspian summit after he talked to the Iranian leader during Khatami's recent visit to 
Moscow.”108  In 2005, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan accepted Russia’s proposal.109  
Without a full consensus, it is unlikely that Russia, Iran, or the other three bordering 
nations will fully unlock the vast resources of the Caspian.110   
In May 2004, Russian, Iranian, and Azerbaijani railway executives signed an 
agreement to build the Kazvin-Resht-Astara rail link to connect their countries.  In 
addition, Russia pledged to build a railway through Azerbaijan and Iran that would  
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connect Russia to the Persian Gulf.  This rail link is expected to rival shipments through 
the Suez Canal and generate $10 billion in revenues that would be shared primarily 
between Russia and Iran.111 
While their economic ties have steadily improved, Russia’s construction of the 
Bushehr nuclear reactor stands out as the capstone element of cooperation between 
Russia and Iran for 2005, and also the source of friction with the West.  During the 
Bratislava Summit on February 24, 2005, President Putin met President Bush and 
reiterated his steadfast position on selling nuclear reactors to Iran.  On February 27, 
Russia signed an agreement with Iran to provide nuclear fuel for the Bushehr reactor 
under the condition that the spent nuclear fuel is returned to Russia.  The added safeguard 
of reclaiming spent nuclear fuel was to alleviate Western concerns that Iran could use it 
to build a nuclear weapon, and to keep the agreement legal in accordance with the 
NPT.112  Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamad Reza Asefi, when responding to a 
question later the same day about Putin’s comment that Iran should not get a nuclear 
weapon, said, “It is not a new stance.  Officials of the Islamic Republic have frequently 
announced that there is no room for nuclear weapons in Iran’s defense doctrine.”113  
Thus, in its statements and actions, Iran has shown no open hostility towards Russia and 
continues to honor its agreement to act as good neighbors. 
Despite strong criticism from the West, Russia’s demonstrated its commitment to 
strengthen relations with Iran by signing a one billion dollar defense contract on 
December 2, 2005.  In this agreement, Russia agreed to sell Tor-M1 Air Defense Systems 
to Iran.114  It is important to point out that this deal came at a time of increased 
international tension over Iran’s nuclear program.  As members of the IAEA continue to 
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press the Iranian nuclear portfolio towards the United Nations Security Council, both this 
and the Bushehr nuclear reactor contract will make it difficult for Russia to agree to any 
kind of meaningful sanctions due to its economic interest in Iran.     
E. SUMMARY ANALYSIS 
After evaluating Russia’s relations with Iran since 1953, it is evident that Russia 
places a great deal of emphasis on maintaining friendly relations with Iran.  This was 
extremely important during the Cold War and is equally important today.  In the eyes of 
the United States, Iran is openly hostile, a supporter of international terrorism, and is 
trying to acquire nuclear weapons.  If Russia subscribed to this view, then its nuclear 
cooperation with Iran would not seem logical.  However, Russia does not openly share 
the United States’ position and does not view its nuclear cooperation with Iran as a threat.  
What explains this difference?  According to Robert Jervis’ theory of international 
politics, Russia’s threat perceptions shaped its views and actions toward Iran.  In 
addition, Jervis argues that perceptions are formed through decision makers’ learning 
during “key events in international history.”115  If Jervis is right, and this thesis claims 
that he is, then Russia’s nuclear cooperation with Iran can be explained through key 
events in their state-to-state relations.   
What has Russia and its leaders learned in their relations with Iran?  First, Russia 
has learned that economic cooperation equates to political influence, and political 
influence equates to security.  Russian policy makers’ views of Iran were shaped by the 
good business relationship that began during the Cold War and sustained them through 
periods of extreme tension, particularly after the Islamic Revolution.  After their 
rapprochement in 1989, Russia’s economic relationship with Iran has taken off and 
shows no immediate signs of faltering, as evident in their nuclear cooperation.  Regarding 
Russia’s future plans toward Iran, Vladimir Orlov states that “Russia is serious about a 
more energetic development of its economic and strategic relations with Iran.”  He 
further added that “[p]artnership with Iran is becoming one of the key foreign policy 
tasks of Russia.”116 
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Second, Russia has learned that Iran holds a geo-strategic position that is just as 
important now as it was during the Cold War.  Although the breakup of the Soviet Union 
may have carved up the empire, it did not reduce Russia’s self-image as a great power.  
Russia has struggled to regain this position in the international community and has 
learned that its relationship with Iran is important.  As Russia balanced East against West 
during the Cold War, it was important for Iran to be on Russia’s side, and the same is true 
today.  While Western powers continue their attempts to isolate and influence Iran, they 
are increasingly turning to Russia for assistance due to Moscow’s good relations with 
Teheran.  This ultimately boosts Russia’s bargaining position in the global arena.  
However, Russia also realizes that if it turns away from cooperating with Iran’s nuclear 
program, then another country, possibly the United States, might fill the vacuum – just as 
the United States did during the Cold War.  Russia has a lot at stake in maintaining 
relations with Iran and is not likely to accept any agreements at the IAEA or the United 
Nations Security Council that will permanently damage this relationship. 
Third, Russia has learned that Iran, in spite of its occasional hostile rhetoric, has 
shown only peaceful intentions towards Russia.  Even at the height of the Cold War, 
Iran’s troops were not aligned against Russia, but were instead oriented towards the Gulf 
to satisfy the Shah’s desire to be a regional power.  This peaceful perception of Iran has 
shaped Russia’s desire to cooperate in the nuclear energy field.  Russia is committed to 
nonproliferation and has no desire to see Iran acquire a nuclear weapon any more than the 
United States does.  Commenting on Russia’s position on nuclear proliferation, Dmitri 
Trenin stated, 
On the whole, the priority of the nuclear proliferation threat to Russia is 
lower than it is for the United States.  The only recent period in which this 
threat was regarded as acute came at the time of the break-up of the 
USSR, when Moscow actively joined forces with Washington (or vice 
versa) to achieve full denuclearization of the three post-Soviet states 
which had nuclear forces deployed on their territory (Ukraine, Kazakstan 
and Belarus).  Once this was achieved by 1994, the sense of urgency 
largely dissipated.117 
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Simply said, Russia’s friendly relations with Iran shaped its threat perceptions toward 
nuclear proliferation.  This is why Russia does not appear overly concerned about its 
nuclear cooperation with Iran.  To Russia, Iran has not let ideology (i.e. support for 
terrorism) get in the way of business and development (it has not been linked in Russian 
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IV. U.S. – IRANIAN RELATIONS:  1953-2005 
The United States has been increasingly concerned about Iran’s nuclear ambitions 
and does not share Russia’s optimistic view that Iran’s civilian nuclear program is strictly 
for peaceful purposes.  As discussed in Chapter III, Russia has a large economic stake in 
Iran’s nuclear program and has provided nuclear technology and assistance to the 
Bushehr nuclear reactor since January 1995.  In terms of economic cooperation, Russia’s 
relations with Iran have markedly improved since 1989.  On the other hand, the United 
States has not had good relations with Iran since the student-led embassy takeover on 
November 4, 1979.  Although this event seriously degraded U.S. – Iran relations, it does 
not explain the current difference between U.S. and Russian views of Iran’s nuclear 
program.  So what actually accounts for their differences?  Similar to that of Chapter III, 
the logic of Robert Jervis is used to explore the “key events in international history” that 
have shaped U.S. threat perceptions of Iran.118 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain why the United State’s threat perceptions 
of Iran and its nuclear program are so different from those expressed by Russia.  Using 
Jervis’ theory on how threat perceptions are formed, this chapter analyzes U.S. – Iranian 
relations from 1953 to 2005 by focusing on the relations with regard to economic, 
nuclear, and strategic interests.  By analyzing the United States’ past and present relations 
with Iran, this chapter provides the second part of the framework to help explain the two 
superpowers’ different threat perceptions of Iran.  By understanding these differences, 
U.S. policy-makers may be able to devise a better plan of engagement to curtail Iran’s 
nuclear ambitions. 
A. 1953–1979:  BALANCING WEST AGAINST EAST 
When President Dwight D. Eisenhower was inaugurated as the thirty-fourth 
President of the United States on January 20, 1953, he set in motion an administration 
that changed the course of history in U.S. – Iran relations.  Eisenhower quickly assessed 
Iran’s strategic importance and was not about to let this oil-rich nation fall into the hands 
of the Communists.  Administration officials were clearly aware that the Communist 
                                                 
118 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), 217. 
42 
Tudeh Party was active in Iran and that Prime Minister Muhammad Mussadiq’s 
nationalist policies might play into their hands.  After carefully weighing all options, 
administration officials met on June 25 and authorized a coup to remove Prime Minister 
Mussadiq from power and replace him with a pro-Western regime.  On August 22, Iran 
had a new Prime Minister, Ardeshir Zahedi, to lead the government, and a grateful 
Muhammad Reza Shah back on the throne.119  While the coup itself did eliminate the 
immediate threat of a Communist takeover, it would have far-reaching consequences on 
U.S. – Iran relations for years to come.120 
The United States tailored its support to meet the two threats it perceived Iran still 
faced: domestic unrest and a potential Soviet invasion.121  Prime Minister Zahedi 
understood these concerns, as did the Shah, and quickly worked to stabilize the 
government.  He wrote to President Eisenhower on August 26 and requested immediate 
financial assistance to renew the Iranian treasury, depleted during Mussadiq’s oil face off 
with the British.  Although Eisenhower responded with a $45 million emergency grant, it 
soon became apparent that further economic concessions would be linked to acceptable 
behavior by the new government.122 
Zahedi and the Shah also took aggressive actions to eliminate the Communist 
Tudeh influence by arresting, jailing, trying, and executing party members, effectively 
forcing the Tudeh underground until the time of the revolution.123  To further promote 
security, the United States sent a military advisor to Iran to help create an internal 
security agency that was later known as the SAVAK.124  This step was taken to ensure 
the Westward-leaning government remained in power to balance against the Soviet 
threat.  As a friendly gesture, Vice President Richard Nixon made an official visit to Iran 
in December 1953, and was highly impressed by what he saw.  In particular, he 
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discovered that the Shah shared U.S. security concerns and was willing to aid the United 
States in opposing Soviet ambitions in the Gulf.  More importantly, Nixon created a 
personal friendship with the Shah that would solidify U.S. – Iran relations for over two 
decades.125   
Shortly after the coup was over, the United States pressured the Shah to resolve 
the oil dispute that had precipitated Mussadiq’s demise.  After lengthy negotiations, Iran 
finally came to an agreement with the international oil consortium, composed of U.S., 
French, and British oil companies, in August 1954, and reluctantly agreed to a 50-50 
profit split.  Many Iranians were unhappy with this agreement, yet the Iranian Parliament 
ratified it in September, and it went into effect on October 29.  Coincidentally, the United 
States approved the next economic aid installment of $127 million on November 2, after 
the first oil tanker left the port.126  From the United States’ perspective, settling the oil 
dispute represented an important step in curbing domestic unrest, which it perceived as 
the primary threat to Iran’s internal security.  By resuming oil exports, Iran could 
generate the revenue it needed to stabilize the government and take care of domestic 
issues. 
With the oil crisis resolved, the United States turned its attention to curbing the 
threat of intervention from Iran’s northern neighbor, the Soviet Union.  This would later 
serve as a source of contention between the two nations.  The United States perceived the 
Soviet Union as more of a regional threat to the Gulf and did not think an invasion likely.  
On the other hand, the Shah had first-hand experience of Soviet occupation during World 
War II, and of Soviet encroachment in Azerbaijan. The Soviets periodically reminded 
him that they would return, as authorized under the provision of a 1921 treaty, if they felt 
their Southern boundary was threatened.  These personal experiences fueled the Shah’s 
obsession to create a large standing army, a policy that would later put him at odds with 
the United States.  Consequently, the United States wanted Iran to take part in a 
collective security arrangement that would negate the requirement for a large standing 
army, and pushed the Shah to join the British-sponsored Baghdad Pact, along with Iraq, 
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Turkey, and Pakistan.  After weighing all of his options, the Shah decided to “officially” 
declare Iran’s pro-Western tilt by signing the Baghdad Pact on November 3, 1955, even 
though he wanted a better security commitment from the United States.127 
1. Line in the Sand 
The United States later added a security guarantee on November 29, 1956, by 
declaring that any threat to the territorial integrity of the pact members would be viewed 
as a grave concern.  The spread of Arab nationalism throughout the Middle East led to 
growing U.S. fears of Communist expansion, which made the timing of this statement 
even more important.  President Eisenhower followed up on this guarantee in a speech to 
Congress on January 5, 1957, which became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine.  In his 
speech, Eisenhower requested Congress authorize:  
The United States to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of 
nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of 
economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national 
independence….The Executive to undertake in the same region programs 
of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations 
which desires such aid….Such assistance and cooperation to include the 
employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect 
the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, 
requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation 
controlled by International Communism.128 
Congress approved Eisenhower’s request on March 9, 1957.  In doing so, the United 
States laid the foundation for U.S. support and assistance to Iran over the next few years. 
Iran’s timely acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine brought about increased 
guarantees of U.S. economic aid and military assistance.  In January 1958, Secretary of 
State John Dulles visited Iran, followed by the Shah’s June to July visit to the United 
States where he tried to secure U.S. business investment in Iran.  During the Shah’s visit, 
a bloody coup started in Iraq on July 14, leading to Iraq’s eventual withdrawal from the 
Baghdad Pact.  The remaining members of the pact retained their agreements, but 
changed its name to the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).  Ultimately, the Iraqi 
coup and increased Soviet presence in Iraq caused the United States to think more 
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seriously about providing military assistance to Iran and accelerate its provisions of 
economic aid.  As a result, the United States’ Secretaries of Defense and Treasury were 
sent to Iran in October 1958 to discuss further U.S. assistance.129       
As the 1950s drew to a close, the strategic relationship between the United States 
and Iran solidified.  On March 5, 1959, the United States signed a bilateral defense 
agreement with the members of CENTO including Iran, going against pressure from the 
Soviets for Iran to remain neutral.  The intent of this agreement was to provide the Shah 
with a U.S. security guarantee to counter-balance Soviet actions in the Middle East, and 
to allay the Shah’s desire for a large Iranian military.  Based on this concept, military 
strategists concluded that a defensive posture was the best option for Iran, since even a 
large army was deemed an inadequate match for the Soviets.  To demonstrate U.S. 
resolve for Iran’s defense, President Eisenhower made a good will visit on December 14.  
During his short visit, Eisenhower addressed Iran’s Parliament and reiterated his 
commitment to Iran’s defense, but also indicated a subtle change in policy: 
Though militarily we in America devote huge sums to make certain of the 
security of ourselves and to assist our allies, we do not forget that--in the 
long term--military strength alone will not bring about peace with justice. 
The spiritual and economic health of the free world must be likewise 
strengthened.130 
While his security commitment would remain, Eisenhower hinted at a curtailment in U.S. 
military assistance, since he still viewed the domestic situation as Iran’s greatest 
threat.131  Eisenhower’s hoped that, in curtailing military aid, the Shah would turn his 
attention to improving Iran’s economy and social base, and less on his military budget. 
In the early 1960s, lawmakers began to question the amount of military and 
economic aid that the United States was sending to Iran.  With widespread reports of 
corruption and mismanagement, they were concerned that the Shah was not using the 
money to alleviate its growing problem of domestic and political unrest.132  The United 
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States provided Iran with over $1 billion in aid, most in the form of a grant, between 
1953 and 1960; $567 million of this was economic and $450 million in military aid to 
sustain Iran’s government and improve its economy.133  Although Iran’s economy 
showed signs of improvement with oil profits increasing from $90 million in 1955 to 
$482 million in 1964, the government accumulated a large amount of debt through 
various international loans.134  While U.S. aid and assistance had allowed the Shah to 
build up his armed forces at the expense of resolving domestic issues, it led to a growing 
perception that the United States supported the Shah’s actions and did not care about its 
people.135   
2. Coercive Reform  
After the Kennedy Administration took office in January 1961, the situation in 
Iran quickly became a priority.  President Kennedy learned of a conversation in which 
Premier Khruschev said a non-Communist revolution was imminent due to the repressive 
government of the Shah and domestic instability.  It is for this very reason that U.S. 
officials had long been pushing the Shah to pursue domestic and political reforms instead 
of a military modernization program.  Similar to 1953, administration officials perceived 
continued domestic unrest as an open door to Communist expansion.  To rectify this 
problem, Kennedy decided to curtail military aid and increase economic aid to Iran to 
pressure the Shah to initiate reforms.136  The Shah had requested greater military 
assistance during his April 1962 visit to the United States, but Kennedy made it clear that 
this was only possible if Iran’s domestic situation improved.  While Vice President 
Johnson visited Teheran, from August 24–26, to reiterate Kennedy’s policies and to offer 
reassurances of U.S. support, he gained a favorable impression of the Shah as a capable 
head of state and trusted ally of the United States in opposing Communism.137 
The aftermath of these visits caused the Shah to reevaluate his actions.  First, it 
forced him to undertake an aggressive domestic reform program, comprised primarily of 
land reforms, which he later dubbed the White Revolution so it would not have any                                                  
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Communist overtones.  Kennedy was pleased with its progress and viewed it as a step in 
the right direction.  The down side of these reforms was that the Shah’s violent repression 
of peaceful demonstrations would later fuel Ayatollah Khomeini’s anti-Shah and anti-
American campaign, and ultimately the revolutionary fervor to topple his regime.138  
Second, it convinced the Shah that he needed to seek rapprochement with the Soviets, 
since he was not confident about the future state and level of U.S. assistance.139  On 
September 15, 1962, the Shah appeased the Soviets by stating that U.S. nuclear missiles 
would not be permitted on Iranian soil and agreeing to sign a nonaggression pact.  This 
allowed the Shah to pursue a dual-natured foreign policy and use Soviet leverage to gain 
influence in Washington.140 
After Johnson took over the Presidency following Kennedy’s November 1963 
assassination, the tone of U.S. – Iran relations would turn back to Iran’s favor.  The Shah 
gained a $200 million loan to purchase military equipment in October 1964, after 
convincing the Majlis to approve a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) for U.S. military 
personnel and advisors.141  Shortly thereafter, President Johnson became consumed with 
the Vietnam War, which took pressure off of Iran’s domestic situation.  In addition, as 
U.S. reliance on Middle East oil increased, Johnson apparently recalled his earlier 
impression of the Shah and was pleased that Iran had a stable monarch on its throne at a 
time when the rest of the Middle East was in turmoil.  This was particularly evident when 
Israel overcame Nasser’s advances in 1967 during the Six Day War.  This event signified 
to Johnson that there was great utility in arming smaller, friendly nations in the Middle 
East.  In November 1967, the United States promised to supply Iran with two full 
squadrons of advanced F-4 aircraft, satisfying the Shah’s desire for high-tech weaponry.  
However, it must be noted that the Shah had essentially threatened to purchase military 
equipment from the Soviets if the U.S. did not sell what he wanted.142 
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3. The Regional Boss and His Fall 
When President Nixon took office in January 1969, the relationship between the 
United States and Iran began to take on a new strategic meaning.143  Nixon’s focus was 
to get the United States out of the Vietnam War and prevent similar usage of U.S. troops.  
During a July 25 stop-over in Guam, he gave a speech and announced what would later 
become known as the “Nixon Doctrine.”  In this speech, he changed U.S. foreign policy 
by stating that “threatened nations would [now] have to supply their own fighting 
manpower, even when the U.S. supported them.”144  The Shah was pleased with this 
announcement and later traveled to Washington in October to meet with his old friend 
Richard Nixon, now President of the United States.  At the conclusion of this meeting, 
the Shah felt he was given the go-ahead to pursue his own interests in the Persian Gulf, 
after having convinced Washington that local forces posed a greater threat to the regime 
than did the Soviets.145  His only stipulation was a repeated request for increased military 
sales and assistance to counter such threats. 
The Shah’s dreams finally came true during President Nixon’s May 30-31, 1972 
visit to Teheran.  During this visit, President Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry 
Kissinger came to a monumental agreement with the Shah that Iran would assume the 
role as a “regional protector” of the Gulf and of Western interests.  In return, the United 
States would make available to the Shah virtually every weapon in the United States’ 
inventory, other than nuclear weapons.  They also agreed to significantly increase the 
number of U.S. military advisors and assistants to train the Iranian armed forces.146  
Nixon’s strategic decision to place U.S. interests in the Gulf under the Shah’s protection 
was more than likely shaped by his earlier perception of the Shah during his first trip to 
Iran in 1953, a view consistent with Jervis’ Delayed Impact on Policy proposition. This 
proposition basically means that early experiences can form a strong impression on an 
individual, but it may be years before the individual is in a position to effect policy.147       
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The only problem is that this earlier perception may have given Nixon an incorrect 
assessment of the Shah’s current ability to protect U.S. interests in the Gulf, and possibly 
led to a policy precedent that set the Carter Administration up for failure.   
It is also important to note that the Shah’s nuclear ambitions were becoming just 
as intense as his desire for military hardware.  In 1970, Iran ratified the NPT and thus 
became eligible to receive nuclear technology and assistance, a measure that paved the 
way for U.S. contracts in 1974 to build nuclear power plants and provide nuclear fuel.  
This agreement was followed by subsequent agreements with Germany and France, in 
1976 and 1977 respectively.148  While such assistance is authorized under the NPT, in 
1975 the Shah stated, “if ever a country [of this region] comes out and wants to acquire 
atomic weapons, Iran must also possess such atomic bombs.”149  It is quite possible that 
the Shah truly had alterior motives for his nuclear program, but it did not change Western 
threat perceptions or prevent Western countries from cooperating with his regime.  In 
fact, “Iran’s nuclear program was considered one of the most advanced in the Middle 
East” in January 1979, at the time of the Islamic Revolution.150 
Toward the mid-1970s, the relationship between the United States and Iran began 
to reach an unprecedented level.  The only real complaint the United States had was high 
oil prices, which had quadrupled in 1973, but were justified as fair by the Shah.  After the 
Shah’s July 1973 trip to the United States, the groundwork was laid to create a joint 
economic commission to significantly expand commercial trade in all areas.  By 1975, 
U.S. estimates anticipated commercial ties could reach as high as $26 billion over the 
next six years.  On the military side, Iran’s purchase of military equipment between 1972 
and 1977 was $16.2 billion.  This was an unprecedented figure, since U.S. military grant 
aid to Iran from 1950 to 1970 was only valued at $1.8 billion.  By 1977, Iran’s defense 
budget totaled $9.4 billion and accounted for 40 percent of the country’s annual 
budget.151  It must be noted that the ultimate cost of this economic policy came at the 
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expense, exploitation, and repression of the Iranian people, a condition that would later 
resurface and forever change the course of U.S. – Iran relations. 
This was the situation faced by President Jimmy Carter when he took office on 
January 15, 1977.  Carter continued Nixon’s policies of arming Iran and was an open 
advocate of human rights.  Although this concerned the Shah at first, Carter’s human 
rights agenda was quickly subsumed within the greater context of a U.S. need for a key 
ally in the Gulf.  This blatant double standard became a rallying point for Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s anti-Shah and anti-U.S. campaign.  In its zeal to have Iran as a strategic ally, 
the United States willingly looked the other way and ignored the deep-rooted domestic 
problems and human rights abuses in Iran.  Coincidentally, the American media had built 
up the Shah’s image for years and rarely issued a negative word about him.  Who would 
expect anything less from the United States’ protector in the Gulf?  The Shah used this 
tide of good will to exert a tremendous amount of influence over the United States 
government by threatening to expand relations with others, such as the Soviets, if his 
requests were not granted.152 
As the situation in Iran deteriorated with large-scale riots and unrest, the 
magnitude of Iran’s problem became increasingly clear to U.S. government officials in 
late 1978.  When it was certain that the Shah would leave Iran, Carter even contacted 
Khomeini and reiterated his desire that the bloodshed stop and asked Khomeini to 
support Prime Minister Bakhtiar’s government.  Khomeini refused on the grounds 
Bakhtiar was too pro-West and later responded by hinting at the future state of U.S. – 
Iran relations by saying, “If the United States behaves correctly, does not interfere in our 
affairs and withdraws the advisors who are intervening in our country, we will respect it 
in return.”153  On January 16, 1979, the Shah departed Iran for Egypt and, soon after, 
Ayatollah Khomeini arrived from Paris on February 1, an event that ushered in the 
Islamic Revolution.154 
Throughout the rest of 1979, the United States continued to work to restore and 
maintain amicable relations with Iran, but encountered increasing hostility.  As the 
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Shah’s condition deteriorated, it became clear that he needed advanced medical treatment 
that was available in the United States.  Upon hearing this, President Carter decided to 
allow the Shah to be flown to New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center on October 22, 
1979.  Iranians viewed this event with great hostility and saw it as an American plot to 
restore the Shah back to power.  Consequently, a group of pro-Khomeini students 
stormed the American Embassy and took its occupants hostage on November 4, an act of 
terror that was blessed by Khomeini.  On November 12, President Carter ordered U.S. 
purchasers to cease buying Iranian oil, followed by the issuance of Executive Order 
12170 on November 14, which froze all Iranian assets.155  Then, on December 4, the 
United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 457, and shortly thereafter Resolution 
461, which called for Iran to release the hostages and to resolve its differences with the 
United States.156 
During the final days of the decade, the future outlook appeared bleak.  In a 
matter of months, the strategic relationship between the United States and Iran had gone 
from an unparalleled level of economic commitment and trust to a state of political 
despair, ultimately removing the cornerstone of U.S. Policy in the Middle East.  To 
further exacerbate matters, the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in December proved that 
Moscow was willing to use force and the United States could do very little about it.   
B. 1980–1991:  TWO-FACED DIPLOMACY 
In early January 1980, President Carter asked the United Nations to impose 
economic sanctions on Iran, similar to those implemented by the United States.  
However, a Soviet veto killed the Security Council resolution on January 13 and handed 
Carter yet another defeat.157  Although the Soviets were concerned about Islamic 
extremism, they welcomed the anti-American aspect of the revolution and believed it 
would allow them to gain a foothold in Iran.  It is likely that President Carter understood  
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this and signaled that U.S. interests in the Gulf would not be undermined in his January 
23 State of the Union Address.  In what later became known as the “Carter Doctrine,” he 
stated: 
Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to 
gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on 
the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will 
be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.158 
Ultimately, this message implied warnings to both the Soviet Union and Iran, and 
demonstrated U.S. resolve during the crisis. 
On April 7, 1980, President Carter broke diplomatic relations with Iran and asked 
the Swiss to represent U.S. interests in Iran, and Algeria to represent Iran in the United 
States.  Later that day, he issued Executive Order 12205, which formally placed U.S. 
economic sanctions on Iran.  On April 11, he made a risky executive decision based on 
time-critical intelligence and ordered a military operation to rescue the hostages.  
Unfortunately, the rescue mission failed on April 25 and was seen as a humiliating defeat 
for the United States.159  Although this made Iran appreciably more defiant, the sanctions 
began to take their toll after the September 22 Iraqi Invasion of Iran.  It soon became 
clear to Khomeini that Iran lacked the financial resources to continue the war with Iraq; 
thus, he became increasingly interested in settling the hostage crisis.  Even after resolving 
most of their grievances through the Algiers Accords, Iran purposefully waited until the 
day that President Carter left office to release the hostages – after 444 days in 
captivity.160 
1. New Threats, Old Policies 
When President Ronald Reagan took office on January 20, 1981, he inherited a 
different situation than faced by Carter.  The hostage crisis ended the honeymoon of U.S. 
– Iran relations, and now the Reagan administration faced an increasing threat of Islamic 
extremism.  During the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini rallied the masses to his side in 
opposition to the Shah; now he pursued the other aspect of the Islamic Revolution and 
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rooted out all traces of Western imperialism, purged the government and military, and 
implemented Islamic Law.  Khomeini also ended Iran’s nuclear projects since they relied 
on and promoted Western technologies and were deemed anti-Islamic.161  In essence, he 
eliminated all opposition to his regime and made it clear that Iran planned to export the 
Islamic Revolution abroad, which the administration viewed as a threat.  Although 
Khomeini initiated a policy of “neither East nor West” regarding the two superpowers, 
the Soviet Union appeared to be in a much better position to exert influence in Iran, 
which was something the United States feared.162   
Reagan initially decided to keep the United States neutral during the Iran – Iraq 
War.  But when it appeared that Iran was getting the upper hand on the Iraqi army in mid-
1982, Reagan decided to “tilt” U.S. support towards Iraq, although secretly providing 
arms and intelligence to Iran.163  The reason for his two-fold approach was to balance 
against the Soviet threat in the region and to ensure that the Persian Gulf was not 
dominated by the Islamic Republic.  When Iran was implicated in both the 1983 Marine 
Barracks bombing and the attempted truck bombing at the United States Embassy in 
Kuwait, Reagan realized the threat that Islamic extremism now posed to the region and to 
U.S. interests.  Clearly, Khomeini’s threat to export the revolution now seemed more 
realistic and deadly.  Reagan promised “swift retribution” against Iran and Syria, but the 
only real consequence was that the State Department designated Iran as an international 
sponsor of terrorism on January 24, 1984.164  In doing so, this prevented Iran from 
obtaining much-needed arms and from receiving exported dual-use technology. 
In the mid-1980s, U.S. threat perceptions regarding Iran diminished slightly.  
First, Ayatollah Khomeini clamped down on the Communist Tudeh Party in 1983 after 
discovering cases of Soviet spying and subversion.165  This was welcomed news to the 
Reagan administration since it reduced the possibility of Soviet intervention in Iran.  
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Second, Mikhail Gorbachev’s rise to power in the Soviet Union eased the tension in East 
– West relations.  In fact, State Department officials hailed this as a potential turning 
point between the two superpowers.  It was said that “Islamic fundamentalism, not 
communism, had become the most serious threat to stability in the Middle East and U.S. 
interests.  Thus, Iran, not the Soviet Union, was America’s principal concern in the 
region.”166  This was not to say that the Soviet Union did not possess the military might 
to oppose the West, but instead, these events lessened the perceptual threat that Moscow 
posed to Western interests in the Gulf. 
 2. Double Standard 
In the latter part of the 1980s, the United States began to clumsily reassert its 
presence and credibility in the Gulf.  While occasional moves towards rapprochement 
with Iran were made, U.S. actions were still driven by the need to counter Soviet 
influence.  This happened during the Iran-Contra affair when Washington used 
questionable tactics to gain influence in Iran.  By the time the fiasco was made public in 
November 1986, the Reagan administration had broken several laws by providing arms to 
Iran, dealing with terrorists to obtain release of U.S. hostages in Lebanon, and diverting 
funds to the Contras.167  Despite being an embarrassment and nearly getting President 
Reagan impeached, it indicated that rapprochement with Iranian moderates was still 
possible.  
By 1987, the administration changed its policies and took a much more aggressive 
approach to the Gulf situation.  In January 1987, U.S. Secretary of State Shultz continued 
to reiterate a need for dialogue with Iran and highlighted that both countries shared a 
strategic interest in containing Communism.  However, he also stated, “American 
interests are directly threatened by the Iranian government’s pursuit of its war with Iraq, 
by its sponsorship of terrorism, and by its collusion with terrorist forces elsewhere in the 
region.”168  In April, the United States finally agreed to reflag eleven Kuwaiti oil tankers 
to counter an offer that had been made by the Soviets.  This significantly increased the 
U.S. naval presence in the Gulf and brought the United States into the regional conflict 
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between Iran and Iraq.  Only this time, the United States visibly sided with Iraq as it 
protected tankers and reasserted its military dominance though periodic engagements 
with Iranian forces.  To prevent further escalation, the United Nations Security Council 
passed Resolution 588 on July 20, 1987, to initiate a cease fire and withdrawal of forces 
by the two nations or face sanctions; Iran refused to accept the resolution in its 
entirety.169  As Iran’s belligerence in the Gulf increased, Reagan decided to tighten the 
reigns and signed Executive Order 12613 on October 30, 1987, banning Iranian imports 
into the United States.170  With Iraqi advances and U.S. sanctions taking their toll, Iran 
finally agreed to accept Resolution 598, and officially ended the war on August 20, 1988.  
Iran had learned that in weakness it had no bargaining power, which may have prompted 
Iranian President Rafsanjani to later declare that “[we] shall fully equip ourselves both in 
the offensive and defensive use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological 
weapons.”171  
3. Outstretched Hand 
As the 1980s came to a close, several events occurred that seemed to offer a 
gleam of hope for amicable relations.  During President George Bush’s Inaugural 
Address on January 20, 1989, he held out a prospect for improved relations with Iran by 
seeking the release of U.S. hostages held by Lebanese Shiite radicals stating, 
To the world, too, we offer new engagement and a renewed vow: We will 
stay strong to protect the peace. The offered hand is a reluctant fist; once 
made -- strong, and can be used with great effect. There are today 
Americans who are held against their will in foreign lands and Americans 
who are unaccounted for. Assistance can be shown here and will be long 
remembered.  Good will begets good will. Good faith can be a spiral that 
endlessly moves on.172 
With the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in June, Iranian President Rafsanjani responded to 
Bush’s offer on August 4 and called the new administration “wiser” than that of Reagan.  
Bush had learned from Reagan’s earlier mistake to deal indirectly with Iran, and in this                                                  
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regard Pakistan served as an excellent mediator.  The United States had realized the 
importance of maintaining an open channel of communication to Iran via Pakistan, and 
all of the hostages were released by December 1991, with only one being killed.  
Unfortunately, Bush forgot to “remember” Iran’s assistance in the matter, which only 
proved to Iran that the United States was incapable of keeping its word.173 
C. 1992–1999:  THE MIRAGE 
The geo-political situation in the Gulf changed in the early 1990s.  Although the 
threat of Communism was removed with the break-up of the Soviet Union in December 
1991, Russia’s interest in Iran was not.  In 1989, Russia and Iran took a major step 
towards rapprochement and began to open up significant areas for economic cooperation.  
In particular, Russia had signed a major arms deal with Iran and had agreed to cooperate 
on the “peaceful” use of nuclear technology.174  This clearly did not help the United 
States in its efforts to isolate the Islamic regime.  With the Soviet threat to Iran now 
removed from its northern border, it appeared that Washington could do very little to 
significantly influence Iran’s behavior, barring a military engagement.  This fact was 
clear to Iran as it observed the United Nations’ coalition expel Saddam Hussein’s forces 
from Kuwait. 
1. Tightening the Reigns 
When President Clinton took office in January 1993, he wanted to take a more 
aggressive approach towards Iran and the Gulf.  With the Communist threat removed, 
there was no longer a need to balance East against West in its relations with Iran or Iraq.  
Instead, Clinton implemented a policy of “Dual Containment” on both.  The intent of this 
policy is succinctly summed up in the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force Report: 
The Clinton administration asserted that it was not trying to change the 
Iranian regime per se but rather its behavior, particularly its quest for 
nuclear weapons, its support for terrorism and subversion in the region, 
and its opposition to the peace process.175 
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Clinton hoped that he could gain support from the international community to tighten 
restrictions on military sales to Iran, but was unsuccessful in his endeavor.  In 1995, the 
administration learned that Conoco Oil Inc. had signed a $1 billion contract with Iran to 
develop a gas field.  While this contract was perfectly legal, it violated the principle of 
dual-containment.176  As a result, Clinton issued Executive Order 12957 on March 15, 
1995, banning U.S. investment in the Iranian oil industry.177  Shortly thereafter, Clinton 
imposed a total ban on all Iranian imports, with the exception of media products, and all 
U.S. exports to Iran, by issuing Executive Order 12959.178  The enactment of such 
stringent policies was proof enough of how far U.S. – Iran relations had deteriorated from 
the late days of the Shah when economic ties alone were expected to reach $26 billion. 
The Clinton administration also tried to pressure the Russians into renouncing a 
January 1995 contract to install a 1,000 Mega Watt nuclear reactor in Iran’s Bushehr 
region.  Russian actions were deemed reckless, especially since there were clear 
indications that Iran had a clandestine procurement network.179  Unfortunately, President 
Yeltsin would not budge.  Vice President Gore, however, was able to secure a 
commitment from Prime Minister Chernomyrdin on June 30 that would stop Russia from 
selling destabilizing weapons to Iran and prevent further arms agreements beyond 
December 31, 1999.180  When Clinton was unable to influence U.S. allies in Europe to 
sanction Iran, Congressional pressure led to the creation of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act 
(ILSA), which was unanimously approved and signed into law on August 5, 1996.  This 
act essentially placed sanctions on any foreign company that invested more than $40  
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million into Iran’s oil and gas sector.181  Ultimately, this act was designed to prevent any 
new sources of foreign investment into Iran’s energy sector, which had been closed off 
since the 1979 Revolution. 
The important point to note during the 1990s was the diminishing role that Iran 
played in U.S. foreign policy.  Iran was once the cornerstone of U.S. policy in the Middle 
East; it protected U.S. interest in the Gulf and significantly helped contain Communism.  
With the Communist threat removed, however, Iran essentially was pushed to the side.  
The true interest in Iran was to eliminate the threat it posed to the Middle East Peace 
Process and to persuade Iran to change its behavior with regard to its support of terrorism 
and quest for nuclear weapons.  Reestablishing diplomatic and economic relations with 
Iran would have their benefits, but ultimately having a stable non-threatening government 
in power, even if relations were still severed, was seen as a step in the right direction. 
2. Chance for Rapprochement 
In May 1997, Seyyed Muhammad Khatami won the presidential election in Iran 
and the hope for a new era in U.S. – Iran relations emerged.  He promoted a more 
moderate form of foreign policy and opened up dialogue with Saudi Arabia and other 
nations in the Persian Gulf.  But more importantly, he appeared on CNN in January 1998, 
and praised the American people and their achievements, and even addressed Iran’s 
positions on issues very sensitive to the United States.  He essentially condemned acts of 
terrorism that were not related to liberation movements (a sore spot after the 1996 Khobar 
Towers bombing), mentioned that Iran would not stand in the way of the Middle East 
Peace Process since it was expected to fail, and stated that “[we] are not a nuclear power 
and do not intend to become one.”182   
The United States viewed Khatami’s statements with extreme optimism and, in 
May, announced it would waive portions of ILSA on the basis of national security, as a 
measure of good faith and to appease European hostility to it.  In June 1998, Secretary of 
State Madeline Albright replied to Iran’s “signs of change” by saying that “[we] are ready 
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to explore further ways to build mutual confidence and avoid misunderstandings.”183  
While the United States did open the opportunity for dialogue, it was rejected by Iran on 
the basis that meaningful government-to-government dialogue cannot take place until the 
United States removes all of the sanctions that Iran considers hostile.184  Consequently, 
what appeared to be a ray of hope quickly turned into a gridlock as neither side was 
willing to make needed concessions to open relations. 
D. 2000–2005:  EMERGING THREAT AND HOSTILE DIPLOMACY 
When the new millennium began, U.S. officials were still holding on to the hope 
of improving relations with Iran, but were also taking actions to prevent Iran from 
acquiring a nuclear weapon.  On March 14, 2000, President Clinton signed the Iran 
Nonproliferation Act, “which authorizes him to take punitive action against individuals or 
organizations known to be providing material aid to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
programs in Iran.”185  While Clinton was clamping down on external agencies that were 
aiding Iran’s nuclear program, Secretary of State Albright was offering a carrot to Iran.  
On March 17, she gave a speech to the American-Iranian Council and made some key 
statements and concessions that hinted towards rapprochement.  She indicated that U.S. 
policies towards Iran during its war with Iraq were a little “short-sighted.”  As a show of 
good faith, she eased up on the sanctions a bit and said that Iran could now begin 
exporting non-oil items like Persian rugs, caviar, and food products such as dried fruits 
and nuts.  In her concluding remarks, she clearly indicated that the United States wanted 
to improve its relations with Iran. 
This morning on behalf of the government and the people of the United 
States, I call upon Iran to join us in writing a new chapter in our shared 
history. Let us be open about our differences and strive to overcome 
them.186 
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The election of President George Bush and the events that ensued would soon set 
the tone for future dealings with Iran.  During his Inaugural Address on January 20, 2001, 
President Bush provided the direction that would shape the future of U.S. – Iran relations 
by stating: 
We will confront weapons of mass destruction, so that a new century is 
spared new horrors.  The enemies of liberty and our country should make 
no mistake: America remains engaged in the world by history and by 
choice, shaping a balance of power that favors freedom. We will defend 
our allies and our interests.187 
Shortly thereafter, in February 2001, the president reversed a Clinton policy and 
reinstated the usage of inflammatory labels like “rogue” to refer to governments, such as 
Iran, that were seeking weapons of mass destruction.188  While statements can be used to 
reach a variety of different audiences, there was a clear change in tone from that of the 
Clinton Administration. 
On June 21, Attorney General Ashcroft issued a report to Congress that 
implicated Iran in the 1996 Khobar Towers Bombing that killed nineteen American 
Servicemen.189  There were no Iranians indicted in the incident, but mentioning Iran was 
enough to rouse emotions that the Islamic Republic’s intentions were not entirely 
peaceful.  In August, Bush approved a five-year extension to ILSA.190  Although ILSA’s 
effectiveness is questionable as far as sanctions go, it was definitely a political signal to 
Iran that all was not well between the two nations. 
1. The Eagle Rages 
On the morning of September 11, 2001, Americans were awakened to a new 
reality, a cold reality that terrorism was real, and it was here.  The horrific images of jet 
airliners crashing into the World Trade Center that were played over and over on the 
television screens served as a constant reminder that the United States was vulnerable.  
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While the previous World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings served as wakeup 
calls, these attacks showed the catastrophic damage potoential of terrorists who, for no 
other reason, sought to kill as many Americans as possible and to destroy our economic 
source of strength.  On September 20, 2001, President Bush addressed Congress, the 
nation, and the world, adding that:    
Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are 
with us, or you are with the terrorists.  From this day forward, any nation 
that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the 
United States as a hostile regime….Terror, unanswered, can not only bring 
down buildings, it can threaten the stability of legitimate 
governments.  And you know what -- we're not going to allow it.191 
In his words, the real threat posed by terrorism was its potential to bring down “legitimate 
governments.” 
Iran responded to this tragedy by issuing official statements of condolence and 
support for the American people.  In fact, Iran even quietly assisted with humanitarian 
relief and search and rescue efforts during the United States’ Campaign in Afghanistan.  
However, after Israel intercepted a ship filled with arms and explosives enroute to 
Palestine from Iran’s Kish Island, it became increasingly clear that Iran’s true motives 
towards Israel, a long-time ally of the United States, were not peaceful.192  In response, 
President Bush labeled Iran part of the “Axis of Evil” during this January 2002 State of 
the Union Address.193  For the most part, relations between the United States and Iran 
after 9/11 amounted to little more than hostile rhetoric.  As the United States prosecuted 
its Global War on Terror, first with operations in Afghanistan, then the invasion of Iraq in 
2003, Iran typically kept a low profile and avoided outright confrontation with the United 
States. 
2. The Crisis Builds 
While Iran’s support for terrorist organizations and its animosity towards Israel 
and the Middle East Peace Process remain serious concerns for the United States, the 
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most alarming issue was Iran’s nuclear program.  Iran repeatedly claimed that its nuclear 
program was strictly for peaceful purposes, but the discovery of a clandestine program in 
late 2002 cast serious doubts.  Since this time, Iran has played a cat and mouse game with 
the IAEA to gain concessions from the three European Union nations, Germany, France, 
and the United Kingdom, commonly referred as the EU-3.  In return, Iran agreed to 
voluntarily suspend its enrichment activities in November 2004, under the provisions 
spelled out in the Paris Agreement, to allow time for the IAEA evaluate its nuclear 
program.194 
The nuclear crisis seriously escalated in 2005 for several reasons.  First, Iran said 
it will not, under any circumstances, give up its nuclear program, a position that Moscow 
did not seem to mind.  Second, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad presidential election in June 
2005 signaled an about-face to reform and a return to hard-line politics.  Finally, it 
appeared very unlikely that the United States could garner enough support, especially 
from Russia, to secure sanctions against Iran in the Security Council, which is essentially 
a repeat of what happened in January 1980.  Unless there is a drastic turn of events, it 
looks like there is a greater possibility that Iran may get closer to producing a nuclear 
weapon, which will likely trigger a serious international crisis or, worse yet, a regional 
war. 
E. SUMMARY ANALYSIS 
The relations between the United States and Iran are complicated, and bear much 
greater consideration than can possibly be covered in the space provided.  Both countries 
went through a lot together and shared a common interest in containing Communism, 
even during periods of ill will.  In looking at the United States’ relations with Iran since 
1953, it is easy to see that their relations reached both extremes.  The governments were 
once trusted allies, but turned into hated enemies in 2006.  What caused this?  Using 
Jervis’ approach, it would appear that threat perceptions played an important role in how 
the leaders of both countries view one another, and hence shaped their policies. 
What has the United States and its leaders learned in their relations with Iran over 
the past fifty-three years?  First, Iran holds a strategic position in the Gulf.  It was vitally 
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important during the United States’ struggle to contain Communism, and is vitally 
important today due to its energy resources.  Although the Communist threat ended, great 
power politics are still at work as Russia protects its economic interest in Iran.  As the 
two superpowers jockeyed for influence in Iran throughout the Cold War, it now appears 
that they are at it once again.  Only this time, the stakes are much higher due to the Iran’s 
questionable nuclear program.  Russia’s unwillingness to take any adverse actions against 
Iran is similar to what happened following the 1979 Revolution, when Russia wanted to 
be seen as Iran’s “friendly” neighbor to the North.  It was only after the Tudeh was forced 
back underground in 1983, due to its subversive activities, that the playing field was 
leveled the Soviets and the United States.  Unlike the United States, the Soviets had 
learned how important it was to establish good business relations with Iran, which is a 
pattern of influence that Russia has continued to this day.  The United States, on the other 
hand, has chosen to form its relations with Iran through hostile rhetoric and economic 
sanctions, neither of which offers any prospect for regaining influence. 
Second, the United States learned that Islamic extremism is a serious threat to its 
security and national interest.  The United States experienced its first act of terrorism 
when Iranian students took over the United States’ Embassy and held its occupants 
hostage.  This one act served as a crucial learning experience that has shaped relations 
ever since.  Gary Sick illustrates this point very well by saying, 
Well, Iran’s behavior overall has caused the whole world to regard it with 
great suspicion.  The hostage crisis [when members of the U.S. embassy in 
Tehran were seized and held captive for 444 days] was a huge turning 
point for the United States and I think it left a permanent psychological 
scar on the United States.  A whole generation was brought up with 
pictures of Iranians in their living room, waving their fists at the camera in 
front of the American embassy.”195 
Iran’s hostility did not stop here.  As the Islamic movement secured its domestic power 
base, it began to export its influence abroad and supported terrorism against both Israel 
and the United States.  Time after time, the United States experienced terrorist attacks – 
U.S. Marines killed in their Beirut Barracks in 1982 – World Trade Center parking 
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garage bombed in 1993 – U.S. service members killed in the Khobar Towers military 
complex in 1996 – World Trade Center towers and Pentagon attacked in 2001.  While 
Iran was not directly linked to all of these events, its support of terrorist organizations 
that were implicated proved to the United States that Iran was supporting a proxy war 
bent on destroying the American way of life.  Even during the moderate years of 
President Khatami – who openly denounced terrorism and nuclear weapons – Iran’s 
actions did not change.  Simply said, U.S. trust of Iran evaporated following 1979. 
Third, the United States learned that its efforts to contain Iran did not stop the 
Islamic Republic from conducting proxy wars through terrorism beyond its borders.  For 
this reason, U.S. threat perceptions, post September 11, indicate that Iran’s government 
does not have peaceful intentions and poses an even greater risk to the United States and 
the free world.  President Bush reiterated this point during a press conference, calling Iran 
a “security threat,” adding that,     
The Iranian President has stated his desire to destroy our ally, Israel. So 
when you start listening to what he has said, to their desire to develop a 
nuclear weapon, then you begin to see an issue of grave national security 
concern.196  
Ultimately, Iran’s hostile rhetoric and behavior have shaped U.S. perceptions to the point 
it no longer views Iran’s nuclear program, although legal under the NPT, as legitimate.  
This position, shaped by hostile perceptions, has driven a wedge between the United 
States and Russia in their positions on nuclear nonproliferation. 
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V. U.S. VS. RUSSIA:  OPPOSING VIEWS OF PROLIFERATION? 
Do Russia and the United States have the same views of nuclear proliferation?  
Based on the analysis presented in Chapter II, both nations appear to subscribe to Scott 
Sagan’s pessimistic view of proliferation, yet have taken categorically opposing 
viewpoints on the “peacefulness” of  Iran’s nuclear program.  The United States contends 
that Iran uses its civilian nuclear program as a cover-up to build an atomic weapon.  
Russia, on the other hand, does not publicly acknowledge such a view.  President Putin 
indicated, in February 2005, that Russia intended to continue cooperating with Iran’s 
nuclear program.197  In October, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that “the 
[Bushehr nuclear power] plant poses no threats to the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime.”198  Since Russia had already indicated that it did not want Iran to acquire 
nuclear weapons, these statements indicate that it did not view nuclear cooperation with 
Iran as a threat.  This position placed Russia at loggerheads with the United States.  If 
Russia and the United States agree on the dangers of proliferation, then what explains 
their opposing views of Iran? 
This chapter concludes, based on the findings of chapters 3 and 4, that different 
threat perceptions explain U.S. and Russian views of Iran’s nuclear program, and hence 
their seemingly opposing views of nuclear proliferation.  In order to substantiate this 
claim further, this chapter builds on the previous chapters to explain how their views of 
nuclear proliferation have changed over the years.  It looks in more detail at the 
Eisenhower era “Atoms for Peace” program,199 and Russian and U.S. views of Iran.  It 
further shows how key international events have shaped their threat perceptions of Iran.  
These include the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the end of the Cold War, and the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States.  This chapter goes on to answer 
three key questions.  First, what importance have the United States and Russia placed on 
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the IAEA and NPT as instruments in controlling the spread of nuclear weapons?  Second, 
how have U.S. and Russian threat perceptions of Iran changed over time, and what 
impact has this had on their willingness to support Iran’s nuclear program?  Third, do the 
actions of Russia and the United States provide a clear indication that they share the same 
positions on nuclear proliferation? 
A. VIEWS OF PROLIFERATION  
The United States has been concerned about nuclear proliferation ever since the 
first atomic explosions on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  Unless it could prevent the spread of 
these deadly weapons, the United States believed that its cities may one day succumb to a 
similar fate.  On August 22, 1949, the Soviet Union tested its first atomic weapon, an 
event that signified the beginning of both vertical proliferation (increase in a states’ 
number of nuclear weapons) and horizontal proliferation (increase in the number of states 
possessing nuclear weapons).200  While both nations recognized the dangers posed by the 
spread of nuclear weapons, their distrust of one another initially prevented a cooperative 
effort to curb proliferation. 
1. Atoms for Peace  
When President Eisenhower took office in 1953, the United States viewed the 
Soviet Union as its greatest threat for a nuclear attack.  With a sufficient stockpile of 
nuclear weapons, the Soviets could launch a surprise attack and decisively knock out the 
United States’ ability to counterattack.  To moderate the threat posed by vertical 
proliferation, Eisenhower launched his “Atoms for Peace” program.  This program 
required the superpowers to contribute designated amounts of fissile material to the IAEA 
to be used to support civilian nuclear programs.  This would reduce the amount of fissile 
material available for weapons production.201  The problem with Eisenhower’s program 
was that the IAEA could hardly determine whether the fissile material it handed out 
would be used for peaceful or military purposes; thus, it unintentionally increased the 
potential for horizontal proliferation.  Unlike the United States, the Soviets quickly 
recognized the potential dangers of this program and were reluctant to agree to such a 
measure.  Henri Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Center, 
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emphasizes that the Soviet “preoccupation with curbing vertical proliferation continued 
even after U.S. officials privately briefed the Soviets, who objected to Eisenhower’s 
proposal on the grounds that the international sharing of nuclear power and technology 
would increase the world’s ability to make bombs.”202   
There is a stark contrast between U.S. and Russian views of proliferation today 
compared to the superpowers’ views of the Atoms for Peace program.  At a glance, it 
appears that the two nations reversed their positions on horizontal nuclear proliferation.  
During the Cold War, the United States’ initial fear of vertical proliferation, fueled by 
fears of a Soviet nuclear attack, was subsumed within the broader challenge of horizontal 
proliferation, especially in the context of Iran.  This is witnessed in the United States’ 
ardent criticism of Russia’s dual-use nuclear exports to and cooperation with Iran.203  
Although under the NPT Russia can legally export dual-use technology to Iran, its 
predecessor, the Soviet Union, once viewed such actions as a threat.  Russia now 
adamantly defends its right to export such technology to NPT member states, especially 
Iran.  The important point to take away from these examples is that U.S. and Russian 
views of proliferation are not static, and have changed along with their threat perceptions. 
2. Russian Perspective 
On February 26, 1989, the Soviet Union and Iran took an unprecedented step 
towards rapprochement and issued a joint communiqué on the future status of their 
relations.  In particular, the communiqué highlighted that: 
The two countries believe that the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean 
should be changed into a region of peace and stability, free from all 
weapons of genocide, including nuclear and chemical weapons;…[There 
would be an] exchange of data on nuclear energy and its peaceful use.”204 
Reflecting back on Iranian Parliamentary Speaker Rafsanjani’s visit to Moscow in 1989, 
Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze quoted Gorbachev as saying, “[this will] open a 
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new chapter in relations between the two countries.”205  This turning point established 
the basic element of trust that has sustained the two countries even during the current 
nuclear showdown at the UN Security Council.  Prior to this time, the Soviets did not 
have a stake in Iran’s nuclear program, conceivably due to Iran’s hostile rhetoric shaped 
by the Iran-Iraq War and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  As mentioned in Chapter 
III, the two countries had disagreements over the division of the Caspian Sea and 
Chechnya, but did not let these situations influence their overall level of economic and 
nuclear cooperation.  Thus, for all practical purposes, Russia’s nuclear cooperation with 
Iran began in 1989. 
When the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991, Russia’s enormous nuclear 
industrial complex was one of the few industries that survived relatively intact and could 
be used to generate revenue.  Russia recognized the importance of keeping its nuclear 
scientists gainfully employed in peaceful nuclear enterprises since there was no domestic 
market for their services, and may have turned a blind eye to some of Minatom’s energy 
dealings.  Although this was an enormous industry, one that was very difficult to keep 
track of, Russia’s actions indicated that it was concerned about the potential threat of 
proliferation.206  In the case of Iran, Russia recognized that Iran was a signatory to the 
NPT and was legally entitled to receive dual-purpose technology.  Iran and Russia were 
on good terms, they had strong economic ties, and they shared a common interest in 
countering U.S. expansion in the Gulf.  Simply said, Iran’s actions did not pose a threat to 
Russia and so there was no reason to fear Iran’s motives for nuclear energy. 
On August 17, 1992, Russia and Iran signed an agreement called “The Utilization 
of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes,” which provided the roadmap for their nuclear 
cooperation.  This agreement was highly criticized by the West, particularly by the 
Clinton Administration, as a threat to the nonproliferation regime.207  On January 8, 
1995, Russia signed a valuable contract with Iran to rebuild the Bushehr nuclear 
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reactor.208  In response to heightened criticism that Russia was contributing to Iran 
building a nuclear weapon, Russia responded: 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty exists, Iran is fulfilling it, and has 
moreover consented to new inspection rules under the 93+2 program.  Iran 
has the right of access to nuclear technologies in this regard.  
[Furthermore,] [t]he contract with Iran is virtually irreproachable from a 
legal standpoint.  Specialists of Minatom specially studied this issue.  
Russia in particular ‘did not sign any documents for two years, until Iran 
reached an agreement with the IAEA on all-encompassing monitoring of 
all atomic facilities in that country.’  The deal fully meets IAEA 
requirements, on which the West agreed.209 
It is important to keep in mind that even though Russia and Iran were on good terms 
during this time, Russia still took care to minimize the potential for proliferation.  On 
February 28, 2005, Russia signed an agreement to provide nuclear fuel for Iran’s reactors 
and required spent fuel be returned within ten years.  This agreement was signed days 
after the Putin-Bush Bratislava Summit where, “[t]he two sides publicly agreed that Iran 
should not be allowed to pursue weapons of mass destruction, but Moscow remained firm 
in its belief that Iran’s nuclear program was intended for peaceful purposes only.210 
3. U.S. Perspective 
As indicated in Chapter IV, the Shah aggressively sought to make Iran a regional 
military power in the 1960s and 1970s.  He was equally ambitious in his pursuit of 
nuclear energy.  In 1968, Iran signed the NPT and later ratified it in 1970, gaining the 
legal right to pursue peaceful nuclear technology.  In 1974, the Shah created the Atomic 
Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and planned to build twenty-three nuclear reactors 
with the help of the West.  The United States, France, and West Germany were all eager 
to sell the reactors to him.211  The Shah was a stable, pro-Western dictator who helped to 
contain Communist expansion.  Simply said, the United States did not perceive the Shah 
and his government as a threat to its security. 
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Although there were conflicting reports about the true nature of the Shah’s 
nuclear program, there were subtle indications that he may have leaned this way.  In 
1975, the Shah stated that, “if ever a country [of this region] comes out and wants to 
acquire atomic weapons, Iran must also possess such atomic bombs.”212  With Iraq 
actively seeking a nuclear program and Israel suspected of having nuclear weapons, his 
comments appear to indicate that he had similar intentions.213  Despite such statements, 
the United States signed contracts in 1974 to build nuclear power plants and to provide 
nuclear fuel.  Subsequent contracts were signed with Germany and France, in 1976 and 
1977 respectively.214  This level of cooperation raises an important question.  Did the 
United States knowingly turn a blind eye to the Shah’s nuclear program as it had done 
over his human rights abuses, simply because it needed Iran’s help in containing 
Communism?  After all, the Iranian nuclear program was deemed, in January 1979, “the 
most advanced in the Middle East.”215 
Iran’s nuclear program quickly fell apart after the 1979 Iranian Revolution.  
Ayatollah Khomeini froze the nuclear program and cancelled nuclear reactor contracts 
with the United States and foreign powers worth billions of dollars.  In addition, he 
expelled many Western-educated nuclear scientists from the country and essentially left 
the program in shambles.216  Moreover, Iranian students seized the United States 
Embassy and its occupants and Iran declared the United States to be its enemy.  In 
discussing Iran’s current interest in nuclear energy, Jo-Anne Hart states, 
the United States perceived Iran’s plans for using civilian nuclear power to 
enhance its economy as legitimate while the Shah controlled the country.  
Yet, as the Islamic Republic of Iran has attempted to benefit by 
restructuring its mix of domestic energy sources, it has faced a far 
different reaction from the United States.217 
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Hart’s statement emphasizes that perceptions of intent play a significant role in shaping 
U.S. policies on proliferation.  Consequently, these events, along with others mentioned 
in Chapter IV, shaped the United States’ perception that after 1979 Iran was no longer a 
responsible user of nuclear technology. 
4. U.S. and Russian Views of IAEA and NPT 
While representatives from both the United States and Russia serve on the IAEA 
Board of Governors, they held different perspectives on the institution’s value to combat 
proliferation.  The Russians were firmly committed to the principle of the IAEA as the 
UN’s nuclear watchdog agency monitoring NPT compliance.  With regard to Iran, 
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated in October 2005 that, “Russia is interested 
in the strongest consolidation of the regime of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, above all nuclear weapons, and is convinced that further IAEA activities in 
Iran will help achieve this goal.”218  As for the NPT, President Putin reiterated Russia’s 
support for it during the 2005 NPT Review Conference where he said, “[it was] an 
important component of the international security system, which has proven to be 
efficient, primarily, in the containment of nuclear weapons’ spread.”219  Although Russia 
supported the IAEA, it was reluctant to take an active stand against Iran during many of 
its meetings.  When the IAEA voted in September 2005 on a resolution that found Iran 
“technically” non-compliant with its safeguards agreement, Russia abstained.   
Given Russia’s stated opposition to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, this does 
not seem like a logical decision.  However, it does make sense in light of the fact that 
Russia openly supported Iran’s nuclear energy program.  This apparent contradiction 
leads one to accept Jervis’ position that “[w]hen statesmen become committed to a given 
policy, they will feel strong psychological pressures to perceive that the threats they face 
can be overcome.”220  This further explains the importance that threat perceptions have  
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on a state’s policy choices, in particular, Russia’s support for Iran’s nuclear program.  As 
Jervis notes, “states will be motivated to perceive a threat as smaller or less troublesome 
than it actually is.”221 
The United States also supported the IAEA and NPT in 2005, but only to the 
extent that they met its foreign policy objectives.  The United States tried to work within 
the IAEA framework as much as possible, but encountered stiff resistance over its 
position on Iran, initially from the Europeans, Russia, and China, and then later only from 
Russia and China.  Why?  The United States claimed that loopholes in the NPT 
legitimately allowed nations to circumvent nonproliferation efforts and pursue nuclear 
weapons.  This is what happened with North Korea; it acquired the nuclear know-how 
and infrastructure to build an atomic weapon and then pulled out of the NPT.  As a result, 
the United States believed that the nonproliferation regime needed to be strengthened.  
President Bush stated on February 11, 2004, that, “Proliferators must not be allowed to 
cynically manipulate the NPT to acquire the material and infrastructure necessary for 
manufacturing illegal weapons.”222  However, President Bush’s March 2006 decision to 
provide nuclear reactors, fuel, and technology to India, an “energy-starved nation,” called 
the President’s nonproliferation commitment into question.223  U.S. behavior was widely 
criticized as rewarding proliferators and encouraging states to opt out of the 
nonproliferation regime.  Although India was not a signatory of the NPT, it had already 
covertly acquired nuclear weapons.  Further U.S. – Indian nuclear cooperation, without 
India joining the NPT, weakened the United States’ position on Iran. 
Threat perceptions provide a likely explanation for the United States’ positions on 
Iran and India.  The United States perceived Iran, but not India as a threat.  To further 
support this claim, it was discovered in 2004 that South Korea violated its 
nonproliferation obligations by conducting clandestine nuclear research and 
experimentation with uranium enrichment activities from 1979 to 2000.  However, Jo-
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Anne Hart states that, “[d]espite the fact that these violations went unreported to the 
IAEA, no demands to totally abandon their programs have been made.”224  Why the 
difference in opinion over South Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear activities?  South Korea, 
unlike Iran, was a long-time ally of the United States and was not perceived as a threat.  
Robert Jervis suggests that, “The decision maker who thinks that the other side is 
probably hostile will see ambiguous information confirming this image, whereas the 
same information about a country thought to be friendly would be taken more 
benignly.”225  Jervis’ reasoning explains the contradictory U.S. positions on India, South 
Korea, and Iran.  The United States had remained highly critical of Iran, a country it had 
problems with since 1979, yet looked more “benignly” at India and South Korea.  The 
contradiction in U.S. and Russian policies indicates that threat perceptions have played an 
extremely important role with respect to views of nuclear nonproliferation. 
B. EVENT-DRIVEN VIEWS OF PROLIFERATION 
Chapter II posed three questions based on Jervis’ psychological theory of 
decision-making:  1) Do perceptions matter?  2) Where do perceptions come from?  3) 
What impact do perceptions have on decision-makers?  The information presented so far 
indicates that perceptions do matter and have shaped both Russia’s and the United States’ 
positions on nuclear nonproliferation.  It is now important to highlight the role that key 
events had in shaping U.S. and Russian threat perceptions of proliferation, in order to 
explain where these perceptions came from. 
1. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 
Prior to 1979, Iran played a central role in helping the United States contain the 
expansion of Communism.  As a regional ally, the Shah had been commissioned under 
the Nixon Doctrine to protect U.S. interest in the Gulf and had access to virtually every 
U.S. made weapon to carry out this task.  Actual and potential economic ties that the 
United States had with Iran were staggering.  With little warning, the Islamic Revolution 
turned this watershed of security and prosperity upside down.  The student-led takeover 
of the United States Embassy became the first act of terrorism, imprinting an image on 
the minds of Americans who lived through this era.  Jervis expects such dramatic events 
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to play a key role in shaping which threats decision-makers’ will perceive.226  Looking 
back on the events of 1979, Jo-Anne Hart noted the ongoing importance of the hostage 
crisis for U.S. perceptions: 
That the hostage-crisis period remains manifest in the American emotional 
perception of Iran after a quarter of a century was quickly revealed 
recently when some of the former hostages mistakenly identified the 
newly elected Iranian president as one of their captors.227 
U.S. concerns were not limited to Iran’s domestic actions.  Khomeini further caused 
alarm by indicating his intention to export the revolution out of Iran.  As acts of terrorism 
linked to Iran increased, it seemed obvious to U.S. decision-makers that Iran was an 
exporter of Islamic extremism and threatened any chances for Middle East peace.  The 
Soviets welcomed the Revolution since it ended a period of American dominance in the 
Gulf.  This was true even though Communism and Islam were ideologically opposed to 
one another, except for their anti-American stance, and despite Khomeini labeling of the 
Soviet Union as the second great Satan.  Without experiencing first-hand the effects of 
Iran’s revolution, Soviet decision-makers were less predisposed than their American 
counterparts to perceive Iran as a threat. 
2. End of the Cold War 
When the Cold War ended in December 1991, it ushered in what many hoped 
would be a new era of multilateralism.  While the spread of Communism no longer posed 
a threat to the United States, the break-up of the Soviet Union presented an even greater 
challenge due to the increased potential for nuclear warheads or nuclear material to get 
into the hands of terrorists and states.  The Cold War’s end effectively brought the two 
sides together in their desire to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons.  Both countries 
cooperated to secure the movement of Soviet nuclear weapons from the former Soviet 
republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.  Preventing nuclear proliferation was a 
top priority for the first Bush and Clinton Administrations.  The United States Congress 
passed the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act in 1991 to help counter the threat posed 
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by loose nuclear warheads and material.228  It provided billons of dollars in U.S. financial 
backing for the Russians to secure their facilities and keep their nuclear scientists 
gainfully employed.  While the end of the Cold War challenged U.S. efforts to contain 
nuclear proliferation from within Russia, it also presented economic opportunities for the 
Russians to put their nuclear science on the market to willing customers – like Iran – that 
were deemed responsible, NPT abiding states. 
3. September 11, 2001 
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon provided a wake-up 
call to the United States and the Russians as to the lengths terrorists will go to engage in 
mass murder and destruction.  Alexei Arbatov captures how U.S. and Russian threat 
perceptions of nuclear proliferation changed in the following statement: 
The horrible tragedies in New York and Washington on the morning of 
September 11, 2001, showed to the whole world a glimpse of the worst-
possible proliferation scenario, in which nuclear weapons would fall into 
the hands of international terrorists who would use them to plunge the 
entire civilized world into shock and chaos. It seems unquestionable that 
further WMD proliferation and the danger of its merger with international 
terrorism (so called super terrorism or catastrophic terrorism) will 
continue to be a priority issue in Russian-U.S. relations, as well as in the 
cooperative efforts of the nuclear powers and nuclear suppliers, in UN 
activities, and in the practice of using force in international policies.229 
The events of September 11, 2001 shaped U.S. threat perceptions regarding nuclear 
proliferation.  Fears of nuclear proliferation prompted a new security doctrine of 
preemption, first used against Iraq for failing to satisfy U.S. concerns regarding its 
weapons of mass destruction programs.  However, it is not clear that 9/11 had the impact 
on Russian decision-makers that Arbatov hoped for.  Putin focused on the threat of 
terrorism, and evidenced less concern regarding proliferation of nuclear weapons to 
states.  Such concerns were reinforced by the 1995 memory that Chechen rebels placed a 
radiological device in a Moscow park.  For Russians decision-makers, 9/11 merely 
reinforced the threat they perceived – not from states – but from non-state actors. 
 
                                                 
228 Defense Threat Reduction Agency, “Threat Reduction History,” 
http://www.dtra.mil/toolbox/directorates/ctr/history.cfm, (March 17, 2006). 
229 Alexei Arbatov, “Horizontal Proliferation: New Challenges,” Russia in Global Affairs 2, no. 2 
(April-June 2004): 148. 
76 
C. CONCLUSION  
World events have changed the threat perceptions of Russia and the United States.  
Both countries are united in their desire to prevent proliferation in general, but their 
approaches to preventing nuclear proliferation to Iran were totally opposite and suggest 
that commitment to nonproliferation exists only when the would-be nuclear state is 
perceived to be a threat.  Russia is on friendly terms with Iran and has no reason to doubt 
Iran’s stated peaceful intentions.  This is important to recognize since, due to its 
geographic proximity, Russia theoretically has a lot to fear from a nuclear-armed Iran.  
Celeste Wallander puts it another way: “although proliferation is a potential security 
threat, the Russian leadership and foreign policy elite do not see Russia as a likely target 
of the countries or non-state actors most likely to obtain WMD capability.”230  Such 
equanimity was quite possibly due to Russia’s willingness to seek diplomatic solutions to 
problems, as well as its economic interests, compared to the United States’ 
confrontational approach towards Iran.  On the other hand, the United States had a lot to 
fear from a nuclear-armed Iran, given their poisoned relations since 1979.  Their lack of 
formal diplomatic relations prevented meaningful dialogue that might alleviate tensions.  
This need for such dialogue was one key lesson that the Soviets and Americans learned 
during the Cold War. 
Do Russia and the United States view nuclear proliferation in the same light?  The 
theoretical framework, as laid out in Chapter II, suggests that Russia and the United 
States are nuclear pessimists.  However, the evidence presented does not fully 
substantiate this claim.  The leaders of both countries have stated views that indicate they 
subscribe to Scott Sagan’s nuclear pessimism argument, yet Russia’s nuclear cooperation 
with Iran seemingly contradicts this position.  So, what explains this apparent difference?  
Simply said, it is fear.  Russia has indicated that it considers the threat of nuclear 
proliferation to states to be less dire than does the United States.231  In the case of Iran, 
Russia’s friendly relations with the Islamic Republic decreased its concerns over nuclear 
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cooperation.  This is a stark contrast to the fears expressed by the United States about 
Iran.  During a trip to Afghanistan on March 1, 2006, President Bush declared: 
Iran must not have a nuclear weapon. The most destabilizing thing that 
can happen in this region and in the world is for Iran to have a -- develop a 
nuclear weapon. And so the world is speaking with one voice to the 
Iranians that it's okay for you to have a civilian power -- nuclear power 
operation, but you shall not have the means, the knowledge to develop a 
nuclear weapon.232 
Both Russia and the United States are concerned about the spread of nuclear 
weapons, but their approaches to curbing proliferation are tied to their threat perceptions.  
If a country is deemed an acceptable risk or a responsible user of nuclear technology, 
then they are likely to cooperate.  The problem is when they do not agree on who is 
considered an acceptable risk, as is the case with Iran.  This truly creates a problem for 
the nonproliferation regime.  Without a clear consensus and commitment from its 
members to universally curb proliferation efforts, the IAEA and NPT are doomed to 
failure.  This raises an important question:  Will Russia and the United States continue to 
work together in this regard?  According to Dmitri Trenin, 
Russia will remain firmly committed to nuclear non-proliferation, above 
all through improvement of its own safety and security procedures and 
export controls.  At the same time, Russia will resist what it regards as 
disingenuous U.S. attempts to make it withdraw from nuclear energy 
cooperation with countries like Iran.233 
Fear explains the two former Cold War adversaries’ views of Iran’s nuclear program.  
This suggests that the nuclear pessimism – nuclear optimism argument is fundamentally 
dependent on threat perceptions – and threat perceptions are likely to shape the future 
success of the nonproliferation regime. 
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